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SYNTHETIC CDOS, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, AND
SECURITIES FRAUD
Jennifer O'Hare *
I. INTRODUCTION
Following the financial crisis, the synthetic collateralized debt
obligation ("CDO")-a complex derivative that received little
mainstream attention prior to the housing meltdown-became
big news.' Journalists wrote numerous articles explaining how
synthetic CDOs spread the contagion of toxic assets throughout
the financial system, nearly bringing down the global economy.'
Government hearings exposed the ugly conflicts of interest inher-
ent in the structuring of synthetic CDOs, as big investment banks
created, sold, and invested in synthetic CDOs and often bet
against their clients.' Some of the world's largest financial insti-
tutions, who faced bankruptcy when their investments lost value,
bitterly complained that these synthetic CDOs had been "de-
signed to fail" so that the investment banks could profit at their
* Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. J.D., 1990, The George
Washington Law School; B.S.E., 1986, The Wharton School of the University of Pennsyl-
vania. The author gratefully acknowledges that research for this article was supported by
a summer stipend from the Villanova University School of Law. The author is also thank-
ful for the exceptional research assistance of Christopher Chuff.
1. See, e.g., Bloomberg News, JPMorgan in Talks to Settle S.E.C. Inquiry Into Secu-
rities, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2011, at B2; Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, Banks Bun-
dled Debt, Bet Against It and Won, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2009, at Al.
2. See, e.g., Kenneth E. Scott & John B. Taylor, Why Toxic Assets Are So Hard to
Clean Up, WALL ST. J., Jul. 20, 2009, at A13; Robin Sidel, Toxic CEOs Beset FDIC As
Banks Fail, WALL ST. J., May 18, 2010, at Cl; Aline van Duyn & Nicole Bullock, Lehman
Ruling Creates New Doubts for CDOs, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2010), http://www.ft.com/cms
/s/O/fefflb24-14e5-11df-8fld-00144feab49a.html#axzz2kio3EnlZ.
3. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. AND GOV. AFFAIRS, PERMANENT
SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG., WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS:
ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE 7, 12, 398 (2011) [hereinafter SENATE STAFF REPORT],
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg57323/pdf/CHRG-112shrg 57323.
pdf.
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expense. Greedy investment banks were seen as the problem, not
the synthetic CDOs themselves.
As a result, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
sued several of the highest profile investment banks for fraud,
and some investors in synthetic CDOs brought their own private
actions for fraud against the investment banks.' Calls for in-
creased regulation of synthetic CDOs resulted in legislation pro-
hibiting investment banks from engaging in certain conflicts of
interest in the sale of synthetic CDOs.6
This article shows that focusing primarily on the misconduct
by investment banks or on the corresponding harm suffered by
investors has caused regulators to miss the real issue: the sale of
the synthetic CDO. Outrage over the extraordinary greed and
sometimes outrageous misconduct by investment banks in the
sale of synthetic CDOs is understandable. However, it was not
the bad behavior of the investment banks that furthered the fi-
nancial crisis; it was the use of the synthetic CDO itself. Because
the regulators focused on the wrong problem, the dangers caused
by synthetic CDOs still exist and must be addressed through ad-
ditional regulation.
Part II of this article defines the synthetic CDO and explains
how it is structured and sold. It also explains how the synthetic
CDO operates to spread risks throughout the financial system.
Part III of this article describes the role of the synthetic CDO in
the financial crisis and summarizes two of the more notorious
synthetic CDOs that were created and sold shortly before the
subprime-mortgage meltdown.
Part IV discusses the antifraud actions that have been brought
against investment banks for the sale of synthetic CDOs. An ex-
amination of the cases shows that private plaintiffs, overall, have
been unsuccessful in their efforts to recover. In addition, Part IV
summarizes the enforcement actions brought by the SEC that
4. NAT'L COMM'N ON THE CAUSES OF THE FIN. AND EcoN. CRISIS IN THE U.S., FIN.
CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 40 (2011) [hereinafter
FCIC REPORT], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf.
5. Id. at 226, 237, 265.
6. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 621, 124 Stat. 1376, (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2a (2012)); Barack
H. Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by the President on 21st Century Fi-
nancial Regulatory Reform (Jun. 17, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/remarks-president-regulatory-reform/.
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have been criticized for both over- and under-reaching in these
cases. Part V summarizes the conflict of interest rules that have
been proposed as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010.
Part VI argues that additional regulation of synthetic CDOs is
necessary. First, it demonstrates that relying on antifraud provi-
sions to manage synthetic CDOs will not be sufficient. Although
the conventional wisdom is that the investment banks that sold
the synthetic CDOs defrauded investors, the article shows that,
in general, this was not the case. It will often be difficult for
large, sophisticated, and well-counseled institutional investors to
establish that they reasonably relied on any false or misleading
statements made by an investment bank in the heavily negotiat-
ed sale of a synthetic CDO. Although investment banks may have
engaged in misconduct, in most cases, the misconduct did not
constitute fraud. Moreover, the article shows that the antifraud
provisions will not adequately regulate synthetic CDOs because
even fraud-free synthetic CDOs present dangerous risks to the fi-
nancial system. Part VI also questions the deterrence value of
SEC enforcement actions brought against investment banks.
Next, it shows that because Congress was primarily concerned
with investment bank misconduct, it enacted conflicts of interest
legislation that does not adequately address the true danger of
synthetic CDOs. The article concludes by urging regulators to
give serious consideration to banning the sale of all synthetic
CDOs.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Introduction to Synthetic CDOs
A synthetic CDO is a type of derivative security created by
matching investors who believe a group of securities will increase
in value with investors who believe that the same group of securi-
ties will default.' It is referred to as a "synthetic" security because
the investors do not actually own the securities referenced by the
synthetic CDO.' Instead, investors will receive cash flows repli-
cating the cash flows that they would have received had they ac-
7. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 142.
8. See id.
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tually owned the referenced securities.' Synthetic CDOs, then,
are often described as securities permitting investors to make
side-bets on the performance of the underlying securities.
As discussed later in this article, creating a synthetic CDO is a
complicated process."o Understanding a synthetic CDO requires
an understanding of the financial instruments that make up the
synthetic CDO. Moreover, there is a tendency to refer to these in-
struments by abbreviations. To understand a synthetic CDO, one
must become familiar with abbreviations such as "CDS," "RMBS,"
and "CDO," which have become part of the global vocabulary of
the financial crisis. What follows is a greatly simplified explana-
tion of these financial instruments.
1. Credit Default Swap ("CDS")
A credit default swap, or "CDS," is essentially insurance that
protects an investor against the default of a corporate note or
bond." For example, assume that an investor purchases a note for
$10 million. This investor might like to be able to protect himself
from loss-that is, hedge his risk-should the corporation default
on the note. To protect himself, the investor could find some sort
of entity-typically a hedge fund, insurance company, or invest-
ment bank-that would be willing to assume the risk of default in
return for a series of payments made by the investor.12 The inves-
tor, referred to as the "protection buyer,"'" and the entity, referred
to as the "protection seller,"" then enter into a contract in which
the protection buyer agrees to make a series of periodic premium
payments for the term of the note to the protection seller." If the
note defaults, the protection seller is required to pay the protec-
tion buyer the par value of the note.16
9. See id.
10. See infra Part II.A.4.
11. See generally Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of
Credit Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1023-27 (2007) (explaining the benefit of cred-
it default swaps). For a more detailed discussion of credit default swaps, see FRANK J.
FABOZZI ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO STRUCTURED FINANCE 48-54 (2006).
12. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 50.
13. See FABoZZI ET AL., supra note 11, at 48.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. Id. at 49.
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Although CDSs can be used to hedge an investor's risk, they
can also be used to speculate on corporate debt by investors who
do not actually own the specific corporate debt. 7 For example, as-
sume that an investor believes that X Corporation will default on
its notes. This investor can buy a CDS on X Corporation's notes,
without actually owning any of the notes. This is referred to as a
"naked CDS." If X Corporation defaults, the investor will receive
the par value of the notes. The naked CDS permits the investor to
take a short position on notes without having to expend the funds
to buy the notes.
2. Residential Mortgage Backed Securities ("RMBSs")
Residential mortgage backed securities, or "RMBSs," are bonds
representing a claim on the cash flows created by a portfolio of
residential mortgages." When a homeowner borrows money and
obtains a mortgage from a bank to purchase a home, the bank
immediately sells the mortgage. 20 The purchaser of the mortgage,
often referred to as a special purpose entity ("SPE") or special
purpose vehicle ("SPV"), pools thousands of mortgages and then
issues securities in the form of bonds to investors.21 This process
is referred to as "securitization."2 2 Principal and interest pay-
ments made by the homeowners to the SPV are then used to pay
the principal and interest due on the RMBS bonds.23
17. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 50 (noting that a CDS purchaser can speculate
on the default of a loan that they do not own); see also SENATE STAFF REPORT, supra note
3, at 326 (stating that some investors purchase CDS contracts as a way to profit from se-
curities that are predicted to "lose value or fail").
18. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 50.
19. See generally SENATE STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 18, 28 (explaining the gen-
eral definition of RMBSs, how they are created, and how they function).
20. See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash, Environmental Superliens and the Problem of
Mortgage-Backed Securitization, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 127, 139-40 (2002); see also
SENATE STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 20, 24-25, 41-42, 239 (generally referencing this
practice of immediate resale on the secondary market for profit and specifically referenc-
ing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's practice, which encouraged poor quality, high risk
home loans that contaminated the secondary market and introduced a great deal of risk to
the U.S. financial system).
21. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Future of Securitization, 412 CONN. L. REV. 1313, 1316
(2009); see also Nash, supra note 20, at 140 (referring to these purchasers of SPVs as
"promoters" or "conduits").
22. SENATE STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 18.
23. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 42, 73 (noting that investors receive invest-
ment returns funded by the principal and interest payments from the loans).
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Investment banks are the driving force behind RMBSs.2 4 They
create the SPV, they identify the mortgages that will be pur-
chased by the SPV, and they locate purchasers for the RMBSs.2 5
They structure the terms of the RMBSs, including the risk and
return of each bond.26 Specifically, RMBS bonds are sold in a se-
ries of classes or "tranches" that represent different risks and
promise different fixed returns.27 The safest tranches are the sen-
ior tranches because they are entitled to be paid first, before the
other tranches are paid." Then the mezzanine tranches are enti-
tled to be paid.29 Finally, if there is any cash left over, the "equity"
tranche will be paid.o Many commentators use a waterfall analo-
gy to explain how the cash flows are distributed in a RMBS."
The securitization process allows investment banks to create
bonds with different risks and returns.2 Credit rating agencies
are retained to assign ratings to the different tranches." Senior
tranches of RMBSs typically receive ratings of AAA or AA, while
mezzanine tranches receive lower ratings of AA or B.34 Obviously,
because the senior tranches are paid first, they have the lowest
risk and the lowest yield." Investors seeking safe investments,
such as pension funds, would be the likely purchasers of the
AAA-rated senior tranches.36 Investors looking for higher returns,
such as hedge funds, would be more likely to purchase the riskier
B-rated mezzanine tranches." The equity tranche, which has the
highest return, might be difficult to sell because of the level of
24. See SENATE STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 8, 11.
25. See id. at 8, 118-19.
26. See id. at 8, 250-51.
27. Id. at 28.
28. Id. at 28, 250-51.
29. Id. at 28.
30. Id.
31. E.g., FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 43 ("Bankers often compared it to a waterfall;
the holders of the senior tranches-at the top of the waterfall-were paid before the more
junior tranches. And if payments came in below expectations, those at the bottom would
be the first to be left high and dry.").
32. See id.
33. See SENATE STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 251, 253, 254.
34. FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 73 fig. 5.3.
35. Id.; SENATE STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 28.
36. See SENATE STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 26-28.
37. See id. at 17, 325 (stating that hedge funds often make risky investments for
higher returns and describing mezzanine tranches as B-rated and more susceptible to
loss).
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risk." If investment banks are not able to sell equity tranches,
they are retained by the investment banks."
The RMBS was an important innovation.40 It allowed commer-
cial banks to shift the risk that homeowners would default on
their mortgages, and freed up capital to permit banks to lend
more money, thereby encouraging home ownership.4' It also cre-
ated the opportunity for investors to choose the most appropriate
investment for their needs. Investors seeking a "safe" investment
would buy the AAA-rated tranche, while investors seeking an in-
vestment with a higher return would buy a lower-rated tranche.4 2
Unfortunately, what started out as a beneficial financial innova-
tion eventually morphed into a well-documented financial disas-
ter.
3. Collateralized Debt Obligation ("CDO")
A CDO is similar to an RMBS. 43 Like the RMBS, the payments
received by CDO holders are from the principal and interest
payments on the portfolio.44 Like the RMBS, the CDO bonds are
issued in a series of tranches.45 Like the RMBS, the tranches of
the CDO are rated by credit rating agencies.46 The main differ-
ence is that, rather than purchasing mortgages, the SPV of a
CDO purchases other types of bonds, including RMBS bonds.47 In
a sense, the CDO re-securitizes RMBSs.
CDOs were initially seen as a positive development because
they were thought to diversify the risk of RMBSs. 48 However, in
38. Id. at 28.
39. Alternatively, the investment banks could bundle these risky RMBSs into CDOs
that could then be sold as safe investments to investors. See infra Part III.A.
40. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 43 (describing the benefits of securitization to
commercial banks).
41. See id.; SENATE STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 17, 28.
42. SENATE STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 28.
43. See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 11, at 1027-31. For a more detailed discussion of
CDOs, see FABOZZI ETAL., supra note 11, at 119-31.
44. See SENATE STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 28-29; Partnoy & Skeel, supra note
11, at 1027 (stating that CDOs are "backed by .. . fixed income assets").
45. SENATE STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 29.
46. Id.
47. See MARK ZANDI, FINANCIAL SHOCK: A 3600 LOOK AT THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE
IMPLOSION, AND HOW To AVOID THE NEXT FINANCIAL CRISIS 117 (2009) (describing a CDO
as "essentially just a mutual fund for bonds and loans.").
48. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 128 ("The securities firms argued-and the
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the years running up to the financial crisis, CDOs served other
interests as well. In particular, CDOs became a vehicle for in-
vestment banks to off-load risky tranches of RMBSs that they
could not sell." The investment bank could re-package and sell
these lower-rated RMBSs in CDO tranches with investment
grade credit ratings."o For example, a CDO might be created from
numerous BBB-rated RMBSs. However, because of the "water-
fall" analogy previously discussed most of the CDO's tranches
would be given a rating of AAA by a credit rating agency, making
them easier to sell to investors." Moreover, the higher yields on
these CDOs made them very attractive to investors.52
4. Synthetic Collateralized Debt Obligation
A synthetic CDO is a CDO with a portfolio consisting entirely
of credit default swaps." Unlike the so-called cash CDO just de-
scribed, a synthetic CDO does not own any bonds.54 Instead, the
synthetic CDO is structured so that it mimics the cash flow of a
CDO that does own bonds." How is this accomplished?
A synthetic CDO is created by bringing together investors who
believe that a specific group of RMBSs-called the reference port-
folio-will increase in value ("long" investors) and investors who
believe that the reference portfolio will default ("short" inves-
tors)." While long investors can initiate synthetic CDOs, during
the financial crisis, investors wanting to take a short position also
initiated the creation of synthetic CDOs." For example, assume
that a hedge fund believes that certain RMBSs will default and
wants to buy $2 billion worth of protection on these RMBSs. The
rating agencies agreed-that if they pooled many BBB-rated mortgage-backed securities,
they would create additional diversification benefits.").
49. See id. at 127-29 ("[T]he CDO became the engine that powered the mortgage sup-
ply chain.").
50. Id. at 127.
51. See SENATE STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 28-29.
52. See id. at 30 ("Higher rates of return, combined with AAA ratings, made subprime
RMBSs and related CDOs especially attractive investments.").
53. See id. at 29. For a good illustration of a synthetic CDO, see FCIC REPORT, supra
note 4, at 144 fig. 8.2. For a more detailed discussion of synthetic CDOs, see FABOZZI ET
AL., supra note 11, at 133-54.
54. FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 142; SENATE STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 29.
55. SENATE STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 29.
56. FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 142.
57. See id. at 145.
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hedge fund might approach an investment bank to create a syn-
thetic CDO. The investment bank will then seek out long inves-
tors who believe the reference portfolio will not default.
The selection of the reference portfolio is a key part of the crea-
tion of the synthetic CDO. Some synthetic CDOs employ a "col-
lateral manager" or "portfolio selection agent," who is typically
described to investors as an independent market professional
with the skills necessary to choose a reference portfolio appropri-
ate for long investors."
After the long investors are identified, an SPV will be created
and will issue notes in tranches rated by a credit rating agency.
The SPV will place the proceeds from the sale of notes in safe in-
vestments. The SPV will then sell $2 billion worth of protection to
the hedge fund by entering into CDSs on the reference portfolio
with the hedge fund. The hedge fund will pay quarterly premi-
ums to the SPV, which will be used by the SPV to pay the princi-
pal and interest payments to the note holders.
The sale of notes relating to synthetic CDOs is structured to
avoid registration under the Securities Act of 1933." In general,
investment banks have sold synthetic CDOs in reliance on Rule
144A, which requires, among other things, that the purchasers of
notes be "qualified institutional buyers."" This requirement en-
sures that the long investors of a synthetic CDO are large, pre-
sumably sophisticated market professionals, such as banks, in-
surance companies, hedge funds, and pension plans.
In addition to the note holders, there is another player neces-
sary to complete the long side of a synthetic CDO. Synthetic
CDOs are not fully funded. In other words, although $2 billion of
protection might be purchased by the hedge fund in a synthetic
58. For example, in the Goldman Sachs ABACUS synthetic CDO, twenty-seven pages
of the sixty-five page "flipbook" were devoted to a discussion of the attributes of its portfo-
lio selection agent, ACA Management LLC. See infra Part III.B.2.
59. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2012); Ed O'Connell et al., An Over-
view of CDO Transactions, 41 REv. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 73, 76 (2008).
60. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(d)(1) (2013). The term "qualified institutional buyer" in-
cludes, inter alia, (1) any insurance company, investment company, pension plan, corpora-
tion, or investment adviser, so long as they "own[] and invest[] on a discretionary basis at
least $100 million in securities"; (2) any dealer who "owns and invests on a discretionary
basis at least $10 million of securities"; and (3) any bank that "owns and invests on a dis-
cretionary basis at least $100 million in securities ... and that has an audited net worth
of at least $25 million." Id. § 230.144A(a)(1).
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CDO, the SPV does not sell $2 billion of notes to long investors.
For example, in a $2 billion synthetic CDO, the SPV might only
sell $200 million of notes, which would appear to leave the SPV
exposed to substantial risk if there should be a credit event.
However, the risk of the unfunded portion of the synthetic CDO,
called the "super senior" tranche, is transferred by the SPV via a
credit default swap to another financial entity, often an insurance
company.6 ' In return for a series of payments, the insurance com-
pany would agree to pay the SPV the amount of any default in
excess of $200 million (the funded amount). Because the funded
tranches are subordinate to the super senior tranche, the super
senior tranche is considered to be extremely low risk.62 Therefore,
the premiums paid by the SPV to the insurance company are cor-
respondingly lower than the interest that must be paid to the
synthetic CDO note holders.
If there are no defaults in the reference portfolio, the hedge
fund will receive nothing and will in fact have made a losing bet;
the hedge fund will be out of pocket for the premium payments.
On the other hand, if there is a default, the SPV is obligated to
pay the hedge fund as much as $2 billion. If a credit event were to
require the SPV to pay $2 billion to the hedge fund, the long in-
vestors would certainly lose their $200 million investment in the
synthetic CDO. In addition, the insurance company that sold the
protection on the super senior tranche would have to pay up to
$1.8 billion. The hedge fund would have won its $2 billion bet
that that the reference portfolio would default.
B. Why Do Synthetic CDOs Exist?
Initially, synthetic CDOs were created to help banks reduce
their regulatory capital costs." Under U.S. and international
banking regulations, banks are required to comply with certain
capital rules. The synthetic CDO allowed banks to transfer the
risk of certain assets on their books without actually having to
transfer the assets to an SPV, thereby reducing the amount of
capital they were required to hold by banking regulations.6 4 This
61. See FABOZZIETAL., supra note 11, at 136.
62. See id. at 134-35.
63. See Laurie S. Goodman, Synthetic CDOs: An Introduction, 9 J. DERIVATIVES 60,
62-63 (2002) (describing the history of synthetic CDOs).
64. See id. at 60, 62-63, 65.
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could be accomplished if the bank's assets comprised the refer-
ence portfolio, and the bank was the protection buyer in the CDS.
This kind of synthetic CDO is called a "balance sheet" synthetic
CDO." Thus, regulatory arbitrage was the motivation behind the
creation of synthetic CDOs.
After banks started to use synthetic CDOs to reduce their regu-
latory capital costs, other types of entities recognized that syn-
thetic CDOs could be used to hedge and manage risks." And
then, finally, synthetic CDOs morphed into a means to speculate.
Thus, more recently, the primary use of synthetic CDOs has been
to allow side bets on the performance of the securities in the ref-
erence portfolio. Short investors would be gambling that the ref-
erence portfolio would default, while long investors would be
gambling that the reference portfolio would not default.67
C. Criticisms of Synthetic CDOs
The housing crash and financial crisis revealed a particular
danger of the synthetic CDO: synthetic CDOs amplify and spread
risk in a unique and dangerous way." To understand the unique
danger, it is helpful to compare a non-synthetic ("cash") CDO
with a synthetic CDO. To create a cash CDO, the SPV must pur-
chase RMBSs to securitize." Once purchased for use in the cash
CDO, these RMBSs cannot be included in any other cash CDO.o
Thus, if the RMBSs default, the loss will be limited to the inves-
65. See FABOZZI ET AL., supra note 11, at 124.
66. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 191-92.
67. See id. at 145. In addition, traditionally, purchasers of notes in synthetic CDO
transactions have enjoyed higher yields. See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 11, at 1028-29
("Synthetic CDOs are regarded as 'pure' arbitrage opportunities, because their tranches
typically are priced at higher yields relative to other similarly rated fixed income invest-
ments.").
68. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 155 ("By layering on correlated risk, [synthetic
CDOs] spread and amplified exposure to losses when the housing market collapsed.");
SENATE STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 328 ("Synthetic CDOs magnified the risk in the
mortgage market because arrangers had no limit on the number of synthetic CDOs they
could create."); see also Morgenson & Story, supra note 1, at Al ("The creation and sale of
synthetic C.D.O.'s [sic] helped make the financial crisis worse than it might otherwise
have been, effectively multiplying losses by providing more securities to bet against."); Joe
Nocera, A Wall Street Invention Let the Crisis Mutate, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2010, at B1
("[S]ynthetic C.D.O.'s [sic] made the crisis worse than it would otherwise have been.").
69. See supra Part II.A.3.
70. See SENATE STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 28-29 (stating that, while cash CDOs
contain real RMBSs, synthetic CDOs only reference existing assets and do not contain ac-
tual mortgages).
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tors in that one particular cash CDO. In effect, the contagion is
stopped at that point.
However, in synthetic CDOs, RMBSs are not purchased by an
SPV; they are simply named as part of the reference portfolio."
That means that more than one synthetic CDO can reference the
same RMBS, which spreads the risk throughout the financial sys-
tem." For example, if a $15 million tranche of an RMBS were to
be included in the reference portfolio of three different synthetic
CDOs, the losses attributable to that RMBS would increase from
$15 million to $60 million. As the author Michael Lewis noted in
his book The Big Short, "[t]he market for 'synthetics' removed any
constraint on the size of risk associated with subprime mortgage
lending."" The contagion could be spread throughout the system
without limitations.
Given this danger, following the financial crisis, numerous
commentators have questioned the use and utility of synthetic
CDOs. For example, well-known investor and philanthropist
George Soros noted that the synthetic CDO "clearly ha[s] no so-
cial benefit."7 4 According to Mr. Soros, the synthetic CDO "did not
finance the ownership of any additional homes or allocate capital
more efficiently; it merely swelled the volume of mortgage-backed
securities that lost value when the housing bubble burst. The
primary purpose of the transaction was to generate fees and
commissions."" Professor Frank Partnoy, who has written exten-
sively on derivatives, stated that synthetic CDOs are "dangerous
and of little or no social value."76 The New York Times financial
71. See supra Part II.A.4.
72. SENATE STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 29; see FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at
xxiv. Multiple referencing of RMBSs substantially contributed to the financial crisis. Ac-
cording to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Report, "synthetic CDOs created by
Goldman [Sachs] referenced 3,408 mortgage securities, some of them multiple times. For
example, 610 securities were referenced twice. Indeed, one single mortgage-backed securi-
ty was referenced in nine different synthetic CDOs created by Goldman Sachs. Because of
such deals, when the housing [market] bubble burst, billions of dollars changed hands."
Id. at 145-46 (footnote omitted).
73. MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT 77 (2010).
74. George Soros, America Must Face Up to the Dangers of Derivatives, FIN. TIMES
(Apr. 22, 2010), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/O/cl237094-4e6e-1ldf-b48d-00144feab49a.ht
ml?siteedition=intl#axzz2gy5HRNUv.
75. Id.
76. Frank Partnoy, Do C.D.O.'s Have Social Value?. Room for Debate, N.Y. TIMES
BLOGS (Apr. 27, 2010, 7:58 PM), http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/27/do-c-
d-o-s-have-social-value/fr-0.
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columnist Andrew Ross Sorkin has also questioned the use of
synthetic CDOs," as have other prominent journalists, some of
whom have called for a ban on synthetic CDOs.7"
III. SYNTHETIC CDOs AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
A. The Role of Synthetic CDOs in the Financial Crisis
Immediately before the onset of the financial crisis, the syn-
thetic CDO market had grown to an enormous size." There were
several reasons for this. First, there was great demand for syn-
thetic CDOs on each side of the transaction.o Synthetic CDOs of-
fered higher returns to long investors and opportunities to hedge
or speculate on a downturn in the housing market to short inves-
tors." Investment banks were happy to sell synthetic CDOs be-
cause they could be created much more quickly and easily than
cash CDOs.82 Moreover, toward the end of the housing bubble, in-
vestment banks encountered a new obstacle that made it more
difficult for them to create new cash CDOs: the supply of sub-
prime mortgages was drying up." Without new subprime mort-
gages, new RMBSs could not be created. And without new
RMBSs, new cash CDOs could not be created. The lack of new
77. Andrew Ross Sorkin, When Wall Street Deals Resemble Casino Wagers, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 20, 2010, at B1 ("What purpose does a synthetic C.D.O.... serve for the capi-
tal markets, and for society?").
78. See, e.g., John Authers, Why Bets on Synthetic CDOs Must Be Banned, FIN. TIMES
(Apr. 23, 2010), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1302fcd6-4efl-lldf-b8f4-00144feab49a.htm
1#axzz2nDt6orbm; Jim Cramer, Beware the Return of Synthetic CDOs, THE STREET.COM
(June 5, 2013, 2:15 PM), http://realmoney.thestreet.com/articles/06/05/2013/beware-return
-synthetic-cdos).
79. According to a report by the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Associa-
tion ("SIFMA"), $66.5 million in synthetic CDOs were issued in 2006. Global CDO Table
1.1 Global CDO Issuance-Type, SEC. INDUS. AND FIN. MKT. ASS'N (Oct. 1, 2013), http://
www.sifma.org/research/statistics.aspx (scroll to section titled "Structured Finance" and
open "Global CDO Issuance and Outstanding" in Excel document).
80. See supra Part II.B.
81. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
82. As previously discussed, to create a nonsynthetic (cash) CDO, an investment bank
would have to find purchasers for the lower-rated tranches of the RMBSs, which was not
necessarily easy to do. The investment bank would also have to expend cash to purchase
the RMBSs. With a synthetic CDO, each of these problems vanished. See supra Part
II.A.4.
83. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 142-43, 155; see also KATALINA M. BIANCO,
THE SUBPRIME LENDING CRISIS: CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF THE MORTGAGE MELTDOWN 15
(2008), available at http:/Ibusiness.cch.com/bankingfinancelfocus/news/subprime-wp-rev.
pdf.
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subprime mortgages, however, would not be an obstacle to creat-
ing new synthetic CDOs, instead, the investment banks could
simply reference already-existing RMBSs. The investment banks
could sell synthetic CDOs to investors clamoring for cash CDOs
without having to buy any RMBSs, and could charge high fees at
each stage of the creation of the synthetic CDO."
When the housing bubble burst, losses spread rapidly through-
out the economy. Homeowners defaulted on their mortgages,
which led to defaults on RMBSs, which in turn led to losses on
the synthetic CDOs referencing those RMBSs." While the short
investors made enormous profits, many long investors in synthet-
ic CDOs, typically insurance companies, commercial banks, and
pension funds, were completely wiped out." For example, AIG
had to be bailed out by the U.S. government." Several large non-
U.S. banks were bailed out by their governments" and all but one
of the monoline insurance companies went out of business."
Commentators targeted synthetic CDOs as a significant cause
of the financial crisis.o For example, the report of the Financial
Crisis Inquiry Commission," a congressionally mandated, bipar-
tisan task force, concluded that synthetic CDOs spread the risk
through the financial system, contributing significantly to the fi-
nancial crisis.92 The report states in part that "[slynthetic
CD s. . . enabled securitization to continue and expand even as
the mortgage market dried up and provided speculators with a
84. FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 142-43.
85. See id. at 145.
86. See id. at 143, 145.
87. See generally Matthew Karnitschnig et al., U.S. to Take Over AIG in $85 Billion
Bailout; Central Banks Inject Cash as Credit Dries Up, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2008, at Al.
88. See, e.g., Neil Irwin & David S. Hilzenrath, Fed's Crisis Aid Benefited Firms Be-
yond Wall St., WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 2010, at A01.
89. See Ambac's Fall: And Then There Was One, THE EcONOMIST (Nov. 4, 2010), http:
//www.economist.com/node/17420088.
90. See, e.g., Morgenson & Story, supra note 1.
91. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission was established by the Fraud Enforce-
ment and Recovery Act of 2009 to "examine the causes, domestic and global, of the current
financial and economic crisis in the United States." Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 5(a), 123 Stat.
1617, 1625 (2009). The FCIC consisted of ten members, appointed by both Republicans
and Democrats. Id. at § 5(b)(1), 123 Stat. at 1625-26. After months of hearings, in Janu-
ary 2011, the FCIC submitted its 633 page report to Congress. See FCIC REPORT, supra
note 4, at vi. Four members of the FCIC dissented from the report. Id. at vii.
92. FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at xxiv (concluding that synthetic CDOs "amplified
the losses from the collapse of the housing bubble by allowing multiple bets on the same
securities and helped spread them throughout the financial system").
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means of betting on the housing market. By layering on correlat-
ed risk, they spread and amplified exposure to losses when the
housing market collapsed."" The U.S. Senate Permanent Sub-
committee on Investigations reached the same conclusion after its
two-year examination of the financial crisis.94 The Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations concluded in its 639 page report
that synthetic CDOs "amplified market risk by allowing investors
with no ownership interest in the reference obligations to place
unlimited side bets on their performance."
B. Conflicts of Interest and Synthetic CDOs
Not surprisingly, investment banks came under attack for
their role in creating and selling synthetic CDOs, as well as other
derivatives." But the focus of the attack was not on the sale of the
synthetic CDO itself. Rather, the criticism targeted the perceived
greed and unethical behavior of investment banks in putting to-
gether the synthetic CDOs." Specifically, at the same time in-
vestment banks were encouraging their clients to purchase the
bonds issued in synthetic CDOs, the investment banks were often
betting against their clients by taking short positions in the very
same transaction." Some disappointed investors claimed that the
synthetic CDOs were actually "designed to fail" so that short in-
vestors would reap great profits at the expense of the long inves-
tors.100 Investment banks were seen as greedy companies, who
were more than happy to structure transactions that ruined the
global economy in return for high fees and speculative profits.'01
The public's outrage over investment banks was magnified when
the government bailed them out.'02
93. Id. at 155.
94. See SENATE STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 327-28.
95. Id. at 639.
96. See id. at 11.
97. Morgenson & Story, supra note 1.
98. See, e.g., id.
99. Id.; see also FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 236.
100. E.g., FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 40; Morgenson & Story, supra note 1.
101. See Morgenson & Story, supra note 1.
102. Moira Herbst, Bailout Outrage Races Across the Web, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK
(Sept. 25, 2008), http://www.businessweek.com/printer/articles/309580-bailout-outrage-rac
es-across-the-web?type=oldarticle.
6812014]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
To provide a better understanding of these arguments, this sec-
tion summarizes two high profile synthetic CDO transactions
that were sold just before the housing bubble burst: the Hudson
Mezzanine Funding 2006-1 synthetic CDO and the ABACUS
2007-AC1 synthetic CDO.
1. Hudson Mezzanine Funding 2006-1 Synthetic CDO
In late 2006, Goldman Sachs marketed a $2 billion synthetic
CDO, Hudson Mezzanine Funding 2006-1, to its clients.'03 In
2008, the securities in the reference portfolio had been down-
graded to junk status, and the largest investor in the synthetic
CDO, Morgan Stanley, had lost approximately $960 million.104
One of the more interesting aspects of this transaction was
that Goldman was the sole short investor in the synthetic CDO."a'
In other words, while Goldman was encouraging its clients to bet
that the housing market would stay strong, Goldman itself was
making a $2 billion bet that that the housing market would fail.
Thus, Goldman was betting against its own clients.
Betting against clients is not a particularly effective long-term
business model, so why did Goldman do it? As discussed previous-
ly, 06 the answer is that a synthetic CDO is one way for an inves-
tor to reduce its exposure to mortgage related securities. Appar-
ently, at the time of the Hudson deal, Goldman had a $6 billion
long position in mortgage-related securities and was becoming in-
creasingly concerned about the housing market and mortgage de-
faults."' By mid-2006, Goldman management had determined
that it needed to reduce its exposure to mortgage-related securi-
ties.1o' By creating synthetic CDOs, and then simultaneously tak-
ing the short position, Goldman could quickly move to a short po-
sition, as long as it structured the transaction appropriately. The
key would be to include in the reference portfolio mortgage-
related securities that Goldman already owned.
103. SENATE STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 390-91. The Hudson synthetic CDO was
one of four CDO transactions that the U.S. Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
examined in its investigation of Goldman Sachs and its conflicts of interest. Id. at 390.
104. Id. at 392.
105. Id. at 390.
106. See supra Part II.B.
107. See SENATE STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 398.
108. See id. at 401-02.
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The Hudson synthetic CDO did not use a third party collateral
agent or portfolio selection agent to select the reference portfo-
lio.' Instead, Goldman itself selected the reference portfolio.no
Goldman included $1.2 billion in mortgage-related securities from
Goldman's own proprietary holdings, enabling Goldman to trans-
fer $1.2 billion of its risk away from Goldman to its clients, the
purchasers of the Hudson notes. '" Thus, the Hudson synthetic
CDO could be seen as part of a plan to move Goldman from a $6
billion long position in mortgage related securities to a net short
position. To make up the remainder of the $2 billion bet, Gold-
man selected $800 million of risky RMBSs-mostly rated BBB+
or below-to be in the reference portfolio, which presumably in-
creased its chances of recovering on its bet at the expense of its
clients.'
Was any of this disclosed to the Hudson investors before they
purchased the notes? Potential purchasers in the Hudson syn-
thetic CDO, like most synthetic CDOs, received several different
disclosure documents as part of their offering materials." Offer-
ing materials for synthetic CDOs typically consisted of three doc-
uments: (1) the termsheet, a short (approximately five page)
summary of the transaction; (2) the "flipbook" or "pitchbook," a
longer summary of the transaction that also contains disclaimers,
risk factors, and a complete portfolio asset list; and (3) the offer-
ing circular, a lengthy document (approximately 200 pages) with
disclosures resembling those found in a Registration Statement
under the Securities Act of 1933.11
109. See id. at 390-91.
110. See id.
111. See id. at 391, 399.
112. See id. at 390.
113. See Offering Circular, Goldman Sachs & Co., Hudson Mezzanine Funding 2006-1,
Corp. (Dec. 3, 2006) [hereinafter Hudson Offering Circular], http://fcic-static.law.Stan
ford.edulcdnmedia/fcic-does/2006-10-00_Hudson%2OMezzanine%2OFunding%202006-1
CDO%200ffering%20Circular.pdf; Pitchbook, Goldman Sachs & Co., Hudson Funding
2006-1, Corp. (Oct. 2006) [hereinafter Hudson Flipbook], http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu
/cdn medialfcic-docs/2006-10-00 Hudson%20Mezzanine%2OFunding%202006-1_CDO%20
Pitchbook.pdf; Preliminary Termsheet, Goldman Sachs & Co., Hudson Mezzanine Fund-
ing 2006-1, Corp. (Oct. 20, 2006) [hereinafter Hudson Preliminary Termsheet], http://fcic-
static.law.stanford.edulcdn medialfcic-docs/2006-10-00Hudson%20Mezzanine%2OFund
ing%202006-1 CDO%20Term%20Sheet.pdf.
114. See Hudson Offering Circular, supra note 113; Hudson Flipbook, supra note 113;
Hudson Preliminary Termsheet, supra note 113; see also 15 U.S.C. § 77g (2012).
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The offering materials did disclose that Goldman would be on
the short side of the transaction."' In fact, the offering circular
states several times that Goldman was the protection buyer in
the Hudson synthetic CDO."6 For example, the flipbook stated:
"On the closing date, the Issuer will enter into pay-as-you-go
credit default swaps (the "Synthetic Securities") with Goldman
Sachs International, ("GSI" and in such capacity, the "Counter-
party"), pursuant to which the Issuer will sell credit default pro-
tection with respect to a portfolio of Reference Obligations." In
addition, the offering materials disclosed that Goldman selected
the reference portfolio.""
The offering materials also included several warnings that the
transaction involved a conflict of interest, such as "[i]t is expected
that Goldman Sachs International, an affiliate of Goldman, Sachs
& Co., will act as the sole Credit Protection Buyer with respect to
the Credit Default Swap, which creates concentration risk and
may create certain conflicts of interest.""' However, the offering
materials also tried to paint Goldman's interest as being compa-
rable to the long investors' and not a conflict of interest.'2 0 For ex-
ample, the flipbook prominently stated that "Goldman Sachs has
aligned incentives with the Hudson program by investing in a
portion of equity"12 ' and "Goldman Sachs will invest in a portion
of the . . . [notes]."12
Furthermore, the offering materials did not disclose that the
purpose of the synthetic CDO was to help Goldman reduce its ex-
posure to mortgage related securities. 2 3 Rather, the flipbook stat-
ed that Goldman's objective was "to develop a long term associa-
tion with selected partners that can adapt to and take advantage
of market opportunities."'2 4 Nor did the offering materials disclose
that $1.2 billion of the reference portfolio consisted of mortgage
115. See Hudson Preliminary Termsheet, supra note 113, at 1; Hudson Flipbook, supra
note 113, at 13; Hudson Offering Circular, supra note 113, at 25.
116. Hudson Offering Circular, supra note 113, at 25, 34, 56, 100.
117. Hudson Flipbook, supra note 113, at 13.
118. See id. at 16; Hudson Preliminary Termsheet, supra note 113, at 1.
119. Hudson Offering Circular, supra note 113, at 50. A similar disclosure can be found
in the flipbook. Hudson Flipbook, supra note 113, at 13.
120. Hudson Flipbook, supra note 113, at 4, 15.
121. Id. at 4.
122. Id. at 15.
123. See id.
124. Id.
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related securities owned by Goldman.125 Instead, the flipbook in-
accurately stated that the reference portfolio was "sourced from
the Street" and was "[not] a Balance Sheet CDO." 26
2. ABACUS 2007-AC1 Synthetic CDO
Another Goldman transaction, ABACUS 2007-ACI
("ABACUS"), has become the poster child for investment bank
misconduct in the sale of synthetic CDOs. 2 7 The $2 billion syn-
thetic CDO closed in late April 2007, just before the housing
market crashed.'28 Approximately six months later, 83% of the
RMBSs in the ABACUS portfolio had been downgraded, while the
remaining 17% were placed on "negative watch."'" Three months
after that, 99% of the portfolio had been downgraded, leading to
approximately $1 billion of losses for the long investors and $1
billion of profits for the short investor. 10
Unlike the Hudson synthetic CDO, in the ABACUS transac-
tion, Goldman did not take a short position itself."' Instead, it
structured the transaction at the request of an important Gold-
man client who wanted to take the entire short position in the
synthetic CDO.'32 The client was Paulson & Co., a hedge fund
known at the time to be very pessimistic about the housing mar-
ket.13 Goldman then solicited other clients to take the long posi-
tions on the synthetic CDO."
125. See id. at 16.
126. Id.
127. The ABACUS synthetic CDO was one of four CDO transactions that the U.S.
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations examined in its investigation of Goldman
Sachs. SENATE STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 9.
128. See id. at 560, 572.
129. Complaint at 3, SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
16, 2011) (No. 10-cv-3229). A credit rating issues a "negative watch" when it is considering
whether to downgrade the rating.
130. See id.
131. SENATE STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 9-10. The ABACUS offering materials
stated that Goldman would be taking the short position in the transaction. However,
Goldman and Paulson & Co. had agreed to enter into a separate credit default swap,
meaning that Paulson, not Goldman, would have the sole short position in the ABACUS
deal. Id. at 396 n.1603.
132. Id. at 396.
133. Id. For additional discussion of Paulson's participation as a short investor in syn-
thetic CDOs, see generally GREGORY ZUCKERMAN, THE GREATEST TRADE EVER (2009).
134. See SENATE STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 10.
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As has been widely reported, Goldman permitted John A. Paul-
son to choose the RMBSs that would become part of the reference
portfolio."' As the short investor, Paulson naturally had an incen-
tive to pick RMBSs that would be likely to default, ensuring that
he would win his bet at the expense of long investors who had
purchased the ABACUS notes.'
The ABACUS synthetic CDO did have a third party portfolio
selection agent, ACA Management, LLC."' According to pub-
lished reports, ACA Management was aware of Paulson and in-
deed, worked with him to select the reference portfolio."' Howev-
er, ACA Management apparently was under the mistaken
impression that Paulson would be purchasing the equity tranche
of the synthetic CDO."' If Paulson had invested in equity-which
is the riskiest long investment in a synthetic CDO-he would
have had incentive to select the best RMBSs for the portfolio, not
the worst RMBSs.
Was any of this disclosed to the purchasers of the ABACUS
notes? The offering materials stated that Goldman, not Paulson,
would be taking the short position in the transaction, and did not
disclose that Goldman had agreed to transfer the entire short po-
sition to Paulson after the transaction closed.'40 The offering ma-
135. See, e.g., Louise Story & Gretchen Morgenson, S.E.C. Accuses Goldman of Fraud
in Housing Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2010, at Al (reporting that the ABACUS transac-
tion was initiated by Paulson).
136. Complaint, supra note 129, at 2.
137. See SENATE STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 396 ("Goldman employed a third par-
ty to serve as the portfolio selection agent, essentially using that agent to promote sales
and mask the role of its client in the asset selection process.").
138. The SEC complaint filed against Goldman Sachs describes the reference portfolio
selection process. Initially, Paulson proposed 123 RMBSs for the portfolio. ACA Manage-
ment responded by sending Goldman a list of eighty-six RMBSs, fifty-five of which had
been included on Paulson's original list. Paulson and Goldman agreed on eighty-two of
ACA Management's suggested RMBSs. ACA Management then sent a revised list of
eighty-two RMBSs, plus twenty-one additional RMBSs. Paulson rejected eight of them.
Ultimately, after a month of negotiations, Paulson and ACA Management agreed on the
ABACUS reference portfolio of ninety RMBSs. Complaint, supra note 129, at 9-11.
139. See id. at 13. ACA sued Goldman and Paulson & Co., contending, inter alia, that
they purposely misled ACA into believing that Paulson was investing in ABACUS equity.
Id. For additional discussion of this case, see infra Part IV.B.3.
140. See Offering Circular, ABACUS 2007-AC1, Ltd., at 1, 10, 70 (Apr. 26, 2007) [here-
inafter ABACUS Offering Circular], http://av.r.ftdata.co.uk/files/2010/04/30414220-ABA
CUS-Offer-Document.pdf- Flipbook, ABACUS 2007-AC1, Ltd., at 8, 19, 50 (Feb. 26, 2007)
[hereinafter ABACUS Flipbook], http://www.math.nyu.edulfaculty/avellane/ABACUS.pdf;
Final Term Sheet, ABACUS 2007-AC1, Ltd., at 2 (July 2, 2007) [hereinafter ABACUS
Termsheet], http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edulcdnmedia/fcic-docs/2007-03-O0.Abacus%20
2007-AC1_CDO%2OTerm%2OSheet.pdf.
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terials did not disclose that Paulson was involved in the selection
of the reference portfolio.14' Instead, the marketing materials
stated that the reference portfolio was to be "selected by" ACA
Management.142 Paulson was not named at all in the offering ma-
terials, not even as the purchaser of the equity tranche; in fact,
the offering materials indicated that there were no investors in
the ABACUS equity tranche."4
The ABACUS offering materials did include specific disclosures
relating to conflicts of interest.'4 4 The offering materials also in-
cluded several disclaimers."' For example, in the Risk Factors
section, the Flipbook stated that Goldman "shall not have a fidu-
ciary relationship with any investor" and that Goldman was not
making any representations about the suitability of buying
ABACUS notes."' Goldman also warned investors that it might
"possess or have access to non-publicly available information re-
lating to the Reference Obligations" and "does not intend to dis-
close" the non-public information to investors.147 Finally, Goldman
disclosed that it "is currently and may be from time to time in the
future an active participant on both sides of the market and have
long or short positions in, or buy and sell, securities . . . or other
derivatives identical or related to [the ABACUS notes]."'
IV. SYNTHETIC CDOs POST-FINANCIAL CRISIS: FRAUD LITIGATION
Following the housing crash, some investors, as well as the
SEC, sued Goldman Sachs and other investment banks, contend-
ing that the sales of synthetic CDOs violated the antifraud provi-
sions of the securities laws. After a brief introduction to the anti-
fraud provisions of the federal securities laws, this section
discusses the private actions brought by investors and the en-
forcement actions brought by the SEC against investment banks.
141. SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., SEC Litigation Release No. 21,489 (Apr. 16, 2010),
available at http://www.sec.govtlitigation/litreleases/2010/1r21489.htm.
142. ABACUS Offering Circular, supra note 140, at 2, 23, 84; ABACUS Flipbook, supra
note 140, at 2, 12; ABACUS Termsheet, supra note 140, at 1, 3.
143. See ACA Fin. Guar. Corp. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 967 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2013); SEC Litigation Release No. 21,489, supra note 141.
144. See ABACUS Offering Circular, supra note 140, at 32-33; ABACUS Flipbook, su-
pra note 140, at 8.
145. See ABACUS Offering Circular, supra note 140, at cover page, iv; ABACUS Flip-
book, supra note 140, at 8.
146. ABACUS Flipbook, supra note 140, at 8.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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A. The Anti-Fraud Provisions of the Securities Laws
1. Private Actions
The general antifraud provision of the federal securities laws is
Rule 10b-5.14 9 To prevail in a Rule 10b-5 action, a plaintiff is re-
quired to show (1) fraud; (2) in connection with the purchase or
sale of a security; (3) scienter; (4) reliance; (5) loss causation; and
(6) damages.'50 Each of these elements is briefly discussed below.
a. Fraud: False or Misleading Statement of Material Fact
To recover, the plaintiff must show that the defendant commit-
ted fraud."' Specifically, the plaintiff must show that the defend-
ant made a false or misleading statement of material fact.'52 Af-
firmative misrepresentations-outright lies-are unlawful."'
Misleading statements-half-truths-are also unlawful.154 Iln oth-
er words, if a person makes a statement, the disclosure must be
completely accurate; the person cannot "omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made . . . not mis-
leading.""' However, a pure omission-complete silence-is not
fraudulent unless there is an independent duty to disclose, such
as the existence of a fiduciary relationship between the plaintiff
and defendant."'
149. Rule 10b-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any fa-
cility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of material fact or omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under with they were made, not misleading,
or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013). In general, state anti-fraud provisions have identical re-
quirements. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-502 (Repl. Vol. 2011) & (Cum. Supp. 2013).
150. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005).
151. Id. at 341 (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988)).
152. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b).
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980).
[Vol. 48:667688
SECURITIES FRAUD
For the plaintiff to recover, the false or misleading statement
must be material."' Information is material if there is a "substan-
tial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider [the
information] important in deciding how to [act].""' The materiali-
ty of a particular piece of information will not be judged in isola-
tion. As the Supreme Court of the United States has stated,
"there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the
omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor
as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made
available.""' Thus, the materiality determination is highly con-
textual in nature.
b. In Connection with the Purchase or Sale of a Security
The "in connection with" requirement ensures that the fraud is
securities fraud. The requirement is met when the fraud "coin-
cides" with the purchase or sale of security.160 In a case when false
or misleading statements are made in disclosure documents for a
sale of securities, there is no question that the fraud coincides
with the purchase or sale of a security.
c. Scienter
To recover under Rule 10b-5, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant acted with scienter, which is defined as a "mental state
embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."161 Negli-
gence is not enough. 6 For scienter to be established, the defend-
ant must recklessly or deliberately make a false or misleading
statement of fact.'63
157. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (citing TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448-49 (1976)).
158. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
159. Id.
160. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 822 (2002).
161. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193-94 n.12 (1976).
162. See id. at 216 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
163. See id. at 193-94 n.12.
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d. Reliance
Reliance is sometimes called "transaction causation."16 4 It is
analogous to "but for" causation found in tort actions.'6 5 In other
words, the defendant's fraud, and not something else, must have
caused the plaintiff to purchase the securities.'16 For a plaintiff to
recover, the reliance must be reasonable, or justifiable. 16 7 Because
reasonable reliance will prove to be a particularly significant is-
sue in fraud claims arising out of the synthetic CDOs, an in-depth
discussion of reliance is set forth below."
e. Loss Causation
Loss causation tests whether the plaintiffs losses were due to
the defendant's fraud.' It is analogous to "proximate causation"
found in tort actions. 7 o If a plaintiffs losses were caused by some-
thing other than the defendant's fraud, such as a downturn in the
economy, then the plaintiff will not be able to recover. "
164. Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 IOWA
L. REV. 811, 840 n.174 (2009) (citing Berckeley Inv. Grp., Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 222
(3d Cir. 2006)).
165. Id. at 819-20 (citing Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 549 (5th
Cir. 1981)).
166. The Supreme Court has recognized two rebuttable presumptions of reliance. Un-
der the Affiliated Ute presumption, the court will presume reliance in certain non-
disclosure cases if the information that was not disclosed is material. Although some syn-
thetic CDO fraud claims may involve non-disclosures, the presumption will generally not
be available to the purchasers of notes because the investment banks cannot be seen as
being in a fiduciary relationship with the purchasers. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972). Under the fraud-on-the-market presumption, the
court will presume reliance in cases involving publicly traded securities if the information
is material. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988). Because synthetic CDOs
are not publicly traded, the fraud-on-the-market presumption cannot be used by purchas-
ers of notes who claim they have been defrauded by investment banks.
167. See 3 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION
352-53 (5th ed. 2005) ("Any reliance by the plaintiff must be reasonable.").
168. See infra Part IV.A.2.
169. HAZEN, supra note 167, at 507.
170. Id. at 505-06.
171. Id. at 507.
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f. Damages
Courts have adopted different approaches to calculating dam-
ages, but the most popular approach is an out-of-pocket measure
of damages."'
2. Reasonable or Justifiable Reliance
As previously stated, an element of private actions under Rule
10b-5, as well as state fraud cases, is reasonable reliance. In de-
termining whether reliance is reasonable, most courts cite the fol-
lowing factors:
(1) "[T]he sophistication and expertise of the plaintiff in financial
and securities matters;" (2) "the existence of long standing business
or personal relationships;" (3) "access to the relevant information;"
(4) "the existence of a fiduciary relationship;" (5) "concealment of the
fraud;" (6) "the opportunity to detect the fraud;" (7) "whether the
plaintiff initiated the stock transaction or sought to expedite the
transaction;" and (8) "the generality or specificity of the misrepre-
sentations."'
Two issues that often arise in cases involving the purchase of
securities in private transactions are the effect of the plaintiffs
sophistication and the impact of contractual provisions, such as
non-reliance disclaimers, on the reasonable reliance inquiry.174
a. Sophistication and the Due Diligence Requirement
In assessing reasonable reliance, courts generally impose a
higher burden on sophisticated plaintiffs.' While the federal se-
curities laws do not define sophistication, courts generally look to
172. See Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 661-62 (1986); Harris v. Am. Inv. Co.,
523 F.2d. 220, 224-25 (8th Cir. 1975).
173. Davidson v. Wilson, 973 F.2d 1391, 1400 (8th Cir. 1992); Molecular Tech. Corp. v.
Valentine, 925 F.2d 910, 918 (6th Cir. 1991); Foremost Guar. Corp. v. Meritor Say. Bank,
910 F.2d 118, 123-24 (4th Cir. 1990); Bruschi v. Brown, 876 F.2d 1526, 1529 (11th Cir.
1989); Grubb v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 868 F.2d 1151, 1164 (10th Cir. 1989); Kennedy v.
Josephthal & Co., 814 F.2d 798, 804 (1st Cir. 1987); Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511,
1516 (10th Cir. 1983).
174. C. Edward Fletcher, III, Sophisticated Investors Under the Federal Securities
Laws, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1081, 1083 (1988); Margaret V. Sachs, Freedom of Contract: The
Trojan Horse of Rule 1Ob-5, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 879, 880-81 (1994).
175. Fletcher, supra note 174, at 1090 ("Sophistication ... often reduces an investor's
ability to show reasonable reliance.").
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factors such as wealth and investment experience to determine
the sophistication of a purchaser. 6 Institutional investors such
as banks, pension funds, hedge funds, and insurance companies
would certainly be considered "sophisticated" for purposes of the
federal securities laws because they are market professionals in-
vesting other people's money.
Moreover, most courts have imposed a due diligence require-
ment on sophisticated plaintiffs.'7  As the Second Circuit has
stated, "[a]n investor may not justifiably rely on a misrepresenta-
tion if, through minimal diligence, the investor should have dis-
covered the truth."'7 Thus, to establish justifiable reliance, pur-
chasers of securities would have to show that they investigated
publicly available information about the securities and they
asked questions about the securities.
b. Non-Reliance Clauses and Big Boy Letters
Another factor that may impact whether a plaintiff will be able
to establish reasonable reliance is the existence of contractual
disclaimers-especially a non-reliance disclaimer or "big boy" let-
ter. "' A non-reliance disclaimer is a contractual provision stating
that the purchaser of securities has not relied on any representa-
tions other than those set forth in the final agreement.' Thus, if
a court enforces the non-reliance clause, false or misleading
statements made by an investment bank's employee during nego-
tiations, for example, would not be actionable because it would
not be reasonable for the purchaser to have relied on the false
statements, given the express disclaimer of reliance.
176. See id. at 1151-52.
177. See id. at 1090 ("In analyzing Rule 10b-5 causation issues, courts often state that
investors may not simply close their eyes to obvious risks, but must exercise due diligence
in protecting themselves.").
178. Brown v. E.F. Hutton Grp., Inc., 991 F.2d 1020, 1032 (2d Cir. 1993).
179. For a discussion about the propriety of using contract law and certain contractual
disclaimers in Rule 10b-5 actions, see Sachs, supra note 174, at 910-14.
180. See Glenn D. West & W. Benton Lewis, Jr., Contracting to Avoid Extra-
Contractual Liability-Can Your Contractual Deal Ever Really Be the "Entire" Deal?, 64
Bus. LAw. 999, 1037 (2009) (setting forth a model non-reliance provision). A non-reliance
clause is similar to an integration clause, a common contractual provision that states that
the final contract represents the entire agreement of the parties. The integration clause,
however, does not expressly disclaim reliance. See David K. Lutz, Note, The Law and Eco-
nomics of Securities Fraud: Section 29(a) and the Non-Reliance Clause, 79 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 803, 804 n.4 (2004).
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A big boy letter is an amped-up non-reliance clause often found
in private securities transactions between sophisticated parties,
such as the sale of synthetic CDOs.'" A big boy letter typically in-
cludes representations such as the following:
(a) that the purchaser is a sophisticated institutional investor
with such knowledge and experience in financial and business
matters that it is capable of evaluating the merits, risks, and
suitability of investing in the securities;
(b) that the purchaser has conducted its own due diligence in-
vestigation of the company, that it is relying exclusively on its
own due diligence investigation and its own sources of infor-
mation and credit analysis with respect to the securities;
(c) that the purchaser has consulted with its own legal, tax,
business, investment, financial, and other advisors to the extent
it has deemed necessary, and has made its own investment deci-
sion based upon its own judgment and not upon any view ex-
pressed by the investment bank;
(d) that the purchaser is not relying for the purposes of making
its investment decision on any advice, opinion, or representation
of the investment bank;
(e) that the purchaser understands that the investment bank
may have non-public information with respect to the issuer or the
securities, and agrees that that the information need not be dis-
closed to it;
(f) that the purchaser recognizes that the investment bank may
have conflicts of interest with the purchaser; and
(g) that the purchaser agrees that the investment bank has not
acted as a financial advisor and does not owe any fiduciary duties
to the purchaser in connection with the purchase of securities."'
181. See Joseph M. McLaughlin, Corporate Litigation: Big Boy Letters and Non-
Reliance Provisions, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 13, 2012, at 5; see also Extra Equipamentos e Ex-
portagAo Ltda. v. Case Corp., 541 F.3d 719, 724 (7th Cir. 2008) (explaining "[in the trade,
no-reliance clauses are called 'big boy' clauses (as in 'we're big boys and can look after our-
selves')").
182. See, e.g., Pharos Capital Partners, LP v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 905 F. Supp. 2d
814, 820-21 (S.D. Ohio 2012) (setting forth an example of a big boy letter). Inside infor-
mation disclaimers that the purchaser understands the investment bank may have non-
public information with respect to the issuer or the securities have been controversial. See
generally Edwin D. Eshmoil, Note, Big Boy Letters: Trading on Inside Information, 94
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In other words, the purchaser of the securities is saying that it
is a "big boy," able to make its own decisions on whether to pur-
chase the securities without the help of the investment bank.
The clear purpose of non-reliance provisions and big boy letters
is to preclude a plaintiffs claim that it reasonably relied on de-
fendant's extra-contractual misrepresentations. Two important
circuit courts for securities regulation-the Second and Seventh
Circuits-have agreed that these disclaimers, at least in heavily
negotiated transactions by well-counseled, sophisticated inves-
tors, act as a complete bar to claims of reasonable reliance. For
example, in Harsco Corp. v. Segui, the Second Circuit noted that
a sophisticated purchaser who negotiated for fourteen pages of
representations and a two-week period to conduct due diligence
could not claim that it reasonably relied on extra-contractual rep-
resentations when the contract expressly stated that the pur-
chaser was relying only on the representations made in the con-
tract. 183
Similarly, in Rissman v. Rissman, the Seventh Circuit affirmed
the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant based
on the existence of a non-reliance clause.' The Seventh Circuit
further supported its decision by noting that
[s]ecurities law does not permit a party to a stock transaction to dis-
avow such representations-to say, in effect, "I lied when I told you I
wasn't relying on your prior statements" and then to seek damages
for their contents. Stock transactions would be impossibly uncertain
if federal law precluded parties from agreeing to rely on the written
word alone.185
Other courts, including the First, Third, and Sixth Circuits,
agree that non-reliance clauses might undercut a claim of rea-
sonable reliance, but have held that the disclaimers are not a dis-
positive bar to Rule 10b-5 claims."' The First and Third Circuits
have emphasized that non-reliance clauses could run afoul of the
CORNELL L. REV. 133 (2008).
183. 91 F.3d 337, 344 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that the presence of a non-reliance clause
in a contract negotiated by sophisticated parties barred the plaintiffs from demonstrating
reasonable reliance for Rule 10b-5 claims and for common law fraud claims under New
York state law).
184. 213 F.3d 381, 387 (7th Cir. 2000).
185. Id. at 383.
186. See Brown v. Earthboard Sports USA, Inc., 481 F.3d 901, 921 (6th Cir. 2007); AES
Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 325 F.3d 174, 181 (3d Cir. 2003); Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d
260, 268 (1st Cir. 1966)).
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anti-waiver provision contained in Section 29(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act.' Section 29(a) bars contractual waivers of, inter
alia, fraud actions under Rule lOb-5." Thus, in Rogen v. flikon
Corp.,' 9 the First Circuit agreed that a contractual provision stat-
ing that the plaintiffs were "fully familiar with the business and
prospects of the corporation, are not relying on any representa-
tions or obligations to make full disclosure with respect thereto,
and have made such investigation thereof as they deem neces-
sary" might undercut a finding of justifiable reliance.Oo However,
the court held that the non-reliance clause could not be disposi-
tive, reasoning that
[t]his is not, in its terms, a "condition, stipulation, or provision bind-
ing [plaintiff] to waive compliance" with the Securities Act of 1934,
as set forth in Section 29(a) of the Act. . . . But, on analysis, we see
no fundamental difference between saying, for example, "I waive any
rights I might have because of your representations or obligations to
make full disclosure" and "I am not relying on your representations
or obligations to make full disclosure." Were we to hold that the ex-
istence of this provision constituted the basis (or a substantial part
of the basis) for finding non-reliance as a matter of law, we would
191
have gone far toward eviscerating Section 29(a).
The Third Circuit reached a similar conclusion. In AES Corp. v.
Dow Chemical Co., the court followed the First Circuit's approach
in Rogen, reversing the district court's dismissal on the grounds
that the non-reliance clause established as a matter of law that
the plaintiff did not reasonably rely on misleading statements. 92
The court concluded the non-reliance clause could be evidence
that the plaintiff acted without reasonable reliance."' In Brown v.
Earthboard Sports USA, Inc., the Sixth Circuit, while not men-
187. AES Corp., 325 F.3d at 180; Rogen, 361 F.2d at 268. Section 29(a) states that:
"[any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with
any provision of [the federal securities laws] shall be void." 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (2012).
188. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013).
189. 361 F.2d at 268 (holding that a non-reliance clause could not bar Rule 10b-5 ac-
tions, but could be used as evidence that the plaintiff did not reasonably rely on mislead-
ing statements); see also Jackvony v. RIHT Fin. Corp., 873 F.2d 411, 416-17 (1st Cir.
1989) (holding that a plaintiff could not show reasonable reliance because, inter alia, the
plaintiff disclaimed reliance on statements other than those set forth in the final transac-
tion document).
190. Rogen, 361 F.2d at 265.
191. Id. at 268 (alteration in original).
192. See AES Corp., 325 F.3d at 180 (holding that a non-reliance clause could not bar
Rule 10b-5 actions, but could be used as evidence that the plaintiff did not reasonably rely
on misleading statements).
193. Id. at 180-81.
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tioning Section 29(a)'s anti-waiver provision, followed Rogen and
AES Corp. to conclude that a non-reliance clause could not by it-
self bar a fraud action, but a court could consider it with other
factors to determine the reasonableness of reliance.194
3. SEC Enforcement Actions
Compared to private plaintiffs, it is easier for the SEC to suc-
cessfully sue under the antifraud provisions of the federal securi-
ties laws. First, the SEC can bring suit under Section 17(a)(2) of
the Securities Act of 1933,'9' which does not require the SEC to
show scienter.'9 Thus, the SEC can bring enforcement actions for
negligent misrepresentations under Section 17(a)(2), which are
much easier to establish than reckless or intentional misrepre-
sentations under Rule 10b-5. Second, if the SEC chooses to sue
under Rule 10b-5, it need not show reliance, loss causation, or
damages.
However, the SEC faces unique challenges in bringing en-
forcement actions. First, the SEC faces serious resource issues.
The SEC cannot bring enforcement actions whenever the federal
securities laws have been violated. Rather, the SEC has discre-
tion over what cases it will bring. The SEC must weigh the cost of
bringing the action against the potential benefits of the action. In
addition, these resource issues mean that very few SEC enforce-
ment actions are fully litigated; most often, its enforcement ac-
tions are filed and settled simultaneously.
194. See 481 F.3d 901, 921 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that a non-reliance clause could not
bar Rule 10b-5 actions, but could be used as evidence that the plaintiff did not reasonably
rely on misleading statements).
195. Rule 17(a)(2) states that:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities ... by
the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in
interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of material
fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made,
no misleading[.]
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2012).
196. While the language of Section 17(a)(2) and Rule 10b-5 is quite similar, the Su-
preme Court has ruled that scienter is not an element of Section 17(a)(2). See Aaron v.
SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 697 (1980).
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B. Private Actions Brought Against Investment Banks
Somewhat surprisingly, there have been only a handful of cas-
es brought by long investors against investment banks alleging
fraud in the sale of synthetic CDOs, and the outcomes of the cas-
es have varied. These private actions have proved to be somewhat
difficult to win. Two of the four cases have been dismissed out-
right, while several fraud claims have been dismissed in the ac-
tions that have been allowed to continue. 197
1. Dodona I, LLC v. Goldman Sachs (Hudson Synthetic CDO)
In Dodona I, LLC v. Goldman Sachs, purchasers of notes is-
sued in the Hudson synthetic CDO discussed previously'
brought a class action in the Southern District of New York
against Goldman, alleging, inter alia, violations of Rule 10b-5 and
common law fraud."' The plaintiff argued that Goldman sold the
notes without disclosing that (1) the notes were sold as part of
Goldman's strategy to reduce its long exposure to subprime mort-
gage-related assets and (2) Goldman did not believe that the
notes had a "realistic chance of being profitable for investors."2 00
Goldman moved to dismiss and the district court, although clear-
ly not happy with Goldman's conduct in structuring and selling
the Hudson synthetic CDO,o' dismissed some, but not all, of the
plaintiff's claims.202
197. The case brought in New York state court against Goldman relating to the
ABACUS synthetic CDO has been dismissed. See ACA Fin. Guar. Corp. v. Goldman Sachs
& Co., 967 N.Y.S.2d 1, 4 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013). Similarly, the case brought in New York
state court against UBS has also been dismissed. See HSH Nordbank, AG v. UBS AG, 941
N.Y.S.2d 59, 76 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012).
198. See supra Part III.B.1.
199. Dodona I, LLC. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 847 F. Supp. 2d 624, 630 (S.D.N.Y.
2012). The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied
Goldman's motion to dismiss the securities fraud claim, and the plaintiff is currently seek-
ing class certification. See id. at 653; Amended Class Action Complaint for Violation of the
Federal Securities Laws and New York Common Law, Dodona I, LLC v. Goldman Sachs &
Co., 847 F. Supp. 2d 624 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 10-cv-7497).
200. Dodona I, 847 F. Supp. 2d at 646.
201. The court rejected Goldman's argument that its conduct was "perfectly normal
and unassailable under prevailing law and industry standards." Id. at 641. The court stat-
ed "[o]n a fair reading of Dodona's Complaint, if the facts alleged were borne out at a trial,
Goldman's conduct, viewed charitably, could be found not only reckless, but bordering on
cynical." Id.
202. See id. at 630.
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The court dismissed the plaintiffs claim that Goldman commit-
ted fraud by failing to disclose that the Hudson synthetic CDO
was part of Goldman's strategy to reduce its long position.203 Ac-
cording to the court, Goldman did not have a duty to disclose this
information.20 4 The court noted that the offering materials did not
mention Goldman's investment and risk-management strategy,
so there was no trigger that would require Goldman to disclose its
strategy to reduce its long position.205 In other words, disclosure
was not necessary to prevent any existing disclosures from be-
coming misleading. In addition, the court noted that the federal
securities laws do not have an independent disclosure require-
ment that would require Goldman to disclose its strategy.2 06 Be-
cause "silence, absent a duty to disclose," does not constitute
fraud, the court dismissed this claim.207
The court allowed the plaintiffs second fraud claim to go for-
ward, but characterized it as a "closer question."208 Goldman ar-
gued that it would be improper to impose liability for an undis-
closed belief or opinion about the future profitability of the
notes.209 However, the court interpreted the plaintiffs claim dif-
ferently, concluding that "[c]ontrary to Defendants' contentions,
the alleged omission is .. . more substantial than a failure to dis-
close 'mere disbelief or 'opinions."'2 10 The court interpreted the
plaintiffs claim as "an allegation that Defendants inaccurately
represented the risk, of which they were actually aware, associat-
ed with investing in the Hudson [notes]."2 1' The court pointed out
that the offering materials included disclosures about the risks of
203. Id. at 646.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Citing the Supreme Court of the United States, Goldman argued that "to recog-
nize liability on mere disbelief or undisclosed motive without any demonstration that the
[offering documents] w[ere] false or misleading about [their] subject would authorize [se-
curities] litigation confined solely to . . . the 'impurities' of a director's 'unclean heart."' See
Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants Goldman, Sachs & Co., The Goldman
Sachs Group, Inc., Peter L. Ostrem and Darryl K. Herrick's Motion to Dismiss the
Amended Complaint at 18, Dodona I, LLC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 847 F. Supp. 2d 624
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 10-cv-7497) (citing Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083,
1096 (1991)).
210. Dodona I, 847 F. Supp.2d at 646.
211. Id.
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investing in the synthetic CDO.212 Therefore, Goldman was under
a duty to be entirely accurate in its discussion of the risks.21 3 As
the court reasoned, "[g]iven Dodona's allegations that [Goldman]
[was] aware of singularly prohibitive risks associated with the
Hudson CDOs in particular, it follows that such boilerplate dis-
closures do not accurately represent [Goldman's] assessment of
the risks."2 " Thus, the court ruled that the plaintiff had ade-
quately alleged a misleading statement in the offering materi-
als.215
The court easily found that the plaintiff adequately pleaded
materiality.21 6 It had more difficulty finding that the plaintiffs
complaint alleged reasonable reliance. Goldman pointed out that
the plaintiff was a sophisticated speculator, whose hedge fund
was "founded for the purpose of investing in high-risk mortgage
related securities" and should not be allowed to claim it blindly
relied on Goldman's disclosures. 2" Goldman argued that the of-
fering materials contained extensive disclosures about the refer-
ence portfolio, which would allow a sophisticated investor such as
the plaintiff to reach his own conclusion about the riskiness of the
referenced securities.2 18 Moreover, the plaintiff had access to pub-
licly available information about the RMBSs named in the refer-
ence portfolio that would have enabled the plaintiff to understand
the riskiness of the notes. 9 The court conceded that the sophisti-
cation of the plaintiff is a factor in determining reasonable reli-
ance, however, "whether Dodona was sophisticated and whether
it should have uncovered the alleged fraud at the time of the in-
vestment using public information are questions of fact."220 The
court decided that discovery was necessary to determine whether
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 647. In addition, the court found that the plaintiff adequately pleaded loss
causation, rejecting Goldman's argument that the plaintiffs losses were due to the market
downturn and not to any misleading statement. Id. at 649-50. The court also concluded
that the plaintiff adequately pleaded scienter. Id. at 641-45.
215. See id. at 646.
216. Id. at 648.
217. See Memorandum of Law, supra note 209, at 1. Moreover, to invest in the Hudson
synthetic CDO, the plaintiff had to represent that he was a "qualified institutional buyer"
within the meaning of Rule 144A. Dodona I, 847 F. Supp. 2d at 646 n.12, 648-49. For
more information on Rule 144A, see supra note 60 and accompanying text.
218. Dodona 1, 847 F. Supp. 2d at 648-49.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 649.
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the plaintiff could show reasonable reliance, and therefore, al-
lowed this claim to go forward. 221
2. HSH Nordbank v. UBS AG (North Street Referenced Linked
Notes, 2002-4 Limited Synthetic CDO)
In HSH Nordbank v. UBS, a German commercial bank that al-
legedly lost $500 million in a synthetic CDO sued UBS AG, alleg-
ing, inter alia, that UBS committed fraud under New York state
22law by misleading the plaintiff as to the riskiness of the notes.
The North Street Referenced Linked Notes, 2002-4 Limited Syn-
thetic CDO was structured by UBS, which also selected the refer-
ence portfolio and took the entire short position in the transac-
tion.223 By agreement, UBS was required to select securities for
the reference portfolio that had minimum credit ratings of BBB.22 4
UBS complied with this requirement, but according to the plain-
tiff, UBS knew that the credit ratings assigned to the securities
in the reference portfolio did not accurately reflect the risks of the
securities.2 5 Furthermore, the plaintiff alleged that UBS purpose-
fully selected BBB rated securities for the portfolio that were ac-
tually more risky than their BBB ratings.22 6 In other words, the
plaintiff accused UBS of using "ratings arbitrage" to select the se-
curities for the reference portfolio.227 According to the plaintiff,
UBS selected securities that "had the requisite credit rating, but
221. Id. at 649-50. While the court let the plaintiffs claim that Goldman made a mis-
leading statement of material fact go forward, the court dismissed the claim that Goldman
engaged in manipulative and deceptive conduct in violation of Rule 10b-5(a) and (c). See
id. at 650-51. The plaintiff argued that the structuring and sale of the Hudson synthetic
CDO-when Goldman knew that the synthetic CDO would likely fail-constituted manip-
ulative conduct. See id. at 650. However, to prevail on a market manipulation claim, the
plaintiff was required to. allege an efficient market. Id. at 650-51. Because there was no
efficient market for the notes, the court dismissed this claim. See id. at 651.
222. HSH Nordbank AG v. UBS AG, 941 N.Y.S.2d 59, 61 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012). Alt-
hough UBS's motion to dismiss the fraud claim was initially denied, the motion to dismiss
was granted on appeal. HSH Nordbank, AG v. UBS AG, No. 600562/08, 2008 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 10416, at *2, *4-5, *23 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 29, 2008), rev'd by HSH Nordbank, 941
N.Y.S.2d at 61. The remaining contract claims were settled for an undisclosed amount. See
Chris Dolmetsch, HSH Nordbank Settles 2008 CDO Suit in N.Y Against UBS,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-1lfhsh-nordbank-
settles-2008-cdo-suit-in-n-y-against-ubs.html.
223. See HSHNordbank, 941 N.Y.S.2d at 62-63.
224. See id. at 62.
225. See id. at 64.
226. Id.
227. Id.
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traded at wide spreads (i.e., were higher risk) for that rating."28
The plaintiff also noted that the spread "reflects the market's un-
derstanding, evidenced by the lower value of the security, of a de-
terioration in credit quality in advance of ratings agency down-
grades."229
UBS moved to dismiss the fraud claim, arguing that the plain-
tiff could not show reasonable reliance.230 UBS pointed out that,
prior to investing in the synthetic CDO, the plaintiff had agreed
that: (1) it was not relying on any advice of UBS to make its in-
vestment decision; (2) it had received advice from its own advi-
sors; and (3) it made its investment decision based on its own
judgment and advice from its own advisors, and not on any
statements made by UBS. 231 The appellate court, in a unanimous
opinion, affirmed the trial court's dismissal on the grounds that
the plaintiff would be unable to show reasonable reliance as a
matter of law.2 2
The court began its analysis with a review of New York's law
on reasonable reliance. First, the court examined the effect of
non-reliance clauses on the reasonable reliance element of
fraud.23 ' According to the court, because the plaintiff had dis-
claimed reliance on UBS's advice, it could not show justifiable re-
liance on UBS's statements about the risk of the reference portfo-
lio.234 According to the court, these disclaimers were not boiler-
plate because they covered the subject matter of the misrepresen-
tation: the reliability of the credit ratings as indicators of risk of
the notes.2 35 Therefore, "[u]nder the disclaimers set forth in the
extensively negotiated governing documents, . . . [the plaintiff]
had no right to look to UBS for advice concerning the suitability
of the deal."2 36
Throughout the opinion, the court stressed the importance of
respecting the disclaimers of reliance, which the court noted came
about following lengthy negotiations by two highly sophisticated,
228. Id.
229. See id. (emphasis omitted).
230. Id. at 64-65.
231. Id. at 65 n.5.
232. Id. at 76.
233. See id. at 65.
234. See id.
235. Id. at 70-71.
236. Id. at 65.
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well-counseled, market participants. For example, according to
the court:
If we were to allow a fraud claim to go forward on this basis, it would
render meaningless HSH's agreement that it was not relying on
UBS for "any advice, counsel or representations (whether written or
oral)" and had "consulted with its own ... business, investment, fi-
nancial, accounting and other advisers to the extent it . . . deemed
necessary." Sustaining this claim would likewise nullify the offering
circular's caution that HSH "must rely on [its] own examination
of ... the merits and risks involved." In effect, the message to the
corporate and financial world would be that "it is impossible for two
businessmen dealing at arm's length to agree that the buyer is not
buying in reliance on any representations of the seller as to a partic-
ular fact." This is a message we decline to send. 3 7
Second, the court stated that the plaintiffs claim of justifiable
reliance failed because New York law requires sophisticated in-
vestors to protect themselves from fraud by conducting a reason-
able investigation into the transaction, and the plaintiff had
failed to meet its due diligence obligations.2 38 The court set forth
the law as follows:
If the facts represented are not matters peculiarly within the party's
knowledge, and the other party has the means available to him of
knowing, by the exercise of ordinary intelligence, the truth or the re-
al quality of the subject of the representation, he must make use of
those means, or he will not be heard to complain that he was in-
duced to enter into the transaction by misrepresentations.3
According to the court, the plaintiffs allegations of fraud relat-
ed to the reliability of the credit ratings, and that information
was not "peculiarly within UBS's knowledge."2 40 On the contrary,
the court noted that given the trading spreads the public market
knew that the securities in the reference portfolio were riskier
than the BBB credit rating.2 4' The court stated that the imposi-
tion of a due diligence duty on a sophisticated purchaser "has
particular application where, as here, the true nature of the risk
being assumed could have been ascertained from reviewing mar-
237. Id. at 72 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Danaan Realty Corp. v. Harris, 157 N.E.2d
597, 600 (N.Y. 1959)).
238. See id. at 61.
239. Id. at 65-66 (quoting Centro Empresarial Cempresa S.A. v. Am6rico M6vil, S.A.B.
de C.V., 952 N.E.2d 995, 1002 (N.Y. 2011)).
240. See id. at 67.
241. Id. at 64.
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ket data or other publicly available information."242 By failing to
conduct its due diligence, the plaintiff could not show reasonable
1*243reliance.
The plaintiff also argued that UBS had committed fraud be-
cause it told the plaintiff that UBS's interests were aligned with
the plaintiffs interests when, in fact, UBS, as the short investor,
had incentive to choose risky securities for the reference portfo-
lio.244 Once again, the court found that the plaintiff could not show
reasonable reliance.2 45 The court pointed to extensive disclosures
in the offering documents that alerted the plaintiffs to UBS's con-
flicts of interest.246 Thus, the court concluded that it was unrea-
sonable as a matter of law for the plaintiff to rely on UBS's
statements that its interests were aligned with the plaintiff's. 24 7
Moreover, according to the court, "[a]ny limitations on UBS's dis-
cretion in managing the reference pool or in its other trading ac-
tivities that HSH expected to be observed should have been
incorporated into the heavily negotiated transactional docu-
ments .248
3. ACA Financial Guaranty Corp. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.
(ABACUS Synthetic CDO)
In ACA Financial Guaranty Corp. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.,
ACA Financial Guaranty Corporation, a monoline insurance
company that sold credit protection on the unfunded super senior
tranche2 49 of the ABACUS synthetic CDO previously discussed,250
sued Goldman for common law fraud for $120 million.251 Accord-
242. Id. at 66.
243. See id. at 69.
244. Id. at 72-73.
245. Id. at 73-74.
246. Id. at 73.
247. Id. at 73-74.
248. Id. at 74.
249. For more information on "super senior" tranches, see supra Part II.A.4.
250. See supra Part III.B.2. ACA Financial Guaranty Corporation was the parent com-
pany of ACA Management, LLC, the portfolio selection agent for the ABACUS synthetic
CDO. See Second Amended Complaint at 10, ACA Fin. Guar. Corp. v. Goldman, Sachs &
Co., 2012 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1940 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 23, 2012) (No. 650027/11).
251. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 250, at 46. Although Goldman's motion to
dismiss was initially denied, the motion to dismiss was granted by a divided appellate
court. Id. at 42, rev'd ACA Fin. Guar. Corp. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 967 N.Y.S.2d 1 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2013).
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ing to the plaintiff, it was fraudulently induced to issue the pro-
tection by Goldman's statements that Paulson's hedge fund would
be taking a long position by investing in equity, when it was ac-
tually taking a short position.252 Goldman moved to dismiss, argu-
ing, inter alia, that the plaintiff failed to adequately allege justi-
fiable reliance.2 " The New York trial court denied Goldman's
motion to dismiss, but the appellate court, in a 4-2 decision, re-
versed the trial court's determination.25 4 The appellate court dis-
missed the plaintiffs fraud claim, holding that the plaintiff failed
to show justifiable reliance as a matter of law.255
The appellate court's opinion emphasized the significance of
the non-reliance clause.256 The plaintiff acknowledged when it en-
tered the transaction that its decision to sell credit protection was
based on its own evaluation of the merits of the transaction, and
not on any view, opinion, or representation expressed by Gold-
man, other than the information set forth in the final offering cir-
cular.2 " According to the court, the disclaimer barred the plain-
tiffs fraud claim because the plaintiff would be unable to show
reasonable reliance.258
Moreover, the appellate court held that the plaintiff had not
met its due diligence responsibilities.2 " According to the court,
the plaintiff could have discovered Paulson's true role in the syn-
thetic CDO, but "apparently chose not to."2"o The court stated that
the offering circular revealed that there was no investor for the
252. See ACA Fin. Guar. Corp. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 650027/11, 2012 N.Y.
Misc. LEXIS 1940, at *14-15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 23, 2012).
253. Id. at *22.
254. Id. at *42, rev'd ACA Fin. Guar. Corp. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 967 N.Y.S.2d 1
(N.Y. App. Div. 2013).
255. ACA Fin. Guar. Corp., 967 N.Y.S.2d at 1.
256. See id. at 3. For additional discussion of disclaimers and reasonable reliance, see
supra Part IV.A.2.
257. See id.
258. Id. In addition, the appellate court concluded that New York's "special knowledge"
exception to non-reliance clauses-which holds that disclaimers are not effective if the
misleading statement relates to facts "peculiarly within the seller's knowledge"-did not
apply because Goldman did not have special knowledge of Paulson's role in the structuring
of the synthetic CDO. Goldman pointed out that the plaintiff interacted with Paulson
throughout the structuring of ABACUS and had the opportunity to ask Paulson questions
about its investment in the transaction, but chose not to do so. Id.
259. See id. at 3. For additional discussion of due diligence and reasonable reliance, see
supra Part IV.A.2.
260. ACA Fin. Guar. Corp. 967 N.Y.S.2d at 2-3.
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equity portion of the synthetic CDO.26 1 That should have put the
plaintiff on notice that Paulson was not a long investor, which in
turn imposed a duty on the plaintiff to ask Goldman and Paulson
about Paulson's involvement. 262 By failing to ask questions, the
plaintiff could not be said to have reasonably relied on Goldman's
statements.263
According to the appellate court, this outcome was especially
appropriate because the plaintiff, a sophisticated well-counseled
entity, could have protected itself by including a "prophylactic
provision" in the agreement to ensure against fraud. 264 In other
words, according to the court, the sophisticated plaintiff should
have done more to protect itself from possible fraud by the in-
vestment bank.
4. China Development Industrial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co.
(Stack 2006-1 Synthetic CDO)
In China Development Industrial Bank v. Morgan Stanley &
Co., a Taiwanese commercial bank sued Morgan Stanley in New
York state court, alleging that Morgan Stanley had fraudulently
induced it to provide the credit protection on the super senior
tranche of the $500 million Stack 2006-1 synthetic CDO. 265 The
synthetic CDO had been structured and sold in 2006, with Mor-
gan Stanley initially providing the super senior swap.26 6 However,
in early 2007, Morgan Stanley initiated discussions with the
plaintiff to transfer its swap to the plaintiff, and, in April 2007,
the plaintiff agreed to provide the credit protection on the super
senior tranche. 267 According to the plaintiff, Morgan Stanley mis-
led it into believing that the super senior tranche was almost
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. See id. at 3.
264. Id. at 2.
265. China Dev. Indus. Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 650957/2010, 2011 N.Y.
Mis. LEXIS 1808 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 25, 2011). The Supreme Court of New York denied
Morgan Stanley's motion to dismiss, and this ruling was affirmed on appeal. Id. at *20,
aff'd China Dev. Indus. Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 927 N.Y.S.2d 52 (N.Y. App. Div.
2011). For additional discussion of this synthetic CDO, see Jesse Eisinger, Explosive
Charge: Morgan Stanley Peddled Security Its Own Employee Called "Nuclear Holocaust,"
PROPUBLICA (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.propublica.org/thetrade/item/explosive-charge-
morgan-stanley-peddled-security-its-own-employee-called-nu.
266. China Dev. Indus. Bank, 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1808, at *3-4.
267. Id. at *3.
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risk-free and that the credit quality of the reference portfolio was
good, when in fact, Morgan Stanley knew that the super senior
tranche was a risky investment and the credit quality of the ref-
erence portfolio was deteriorating. 261 In particular, the plaintiff
alleged that Morgan Stanley "corrupted" the ratings process by
paying the credit rating agency much higher fees than are typi-
cal. 269
Morgan Stanley moved to dismiss, arguing, inter alia, that the
plaintiff could not establish reasonable reliance because (1) the
plaintiff had agreed to a non-reliance provision;270 and (2) the
plaintiff failed to meet its due diligence obligations.2 71 However,
the New York trial court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding
that the special knowledge exception to the effectiveness of non-
reliance clauses was applicable. 272 According to the court, the in-
formation about Morgan Stanley's corruption of the credit ratings
process was peculiarly within Morgan Stanley's control. 27 This
also meant that it could not have been discovered by the plaintiff
through any due diligence investigation. Thus, the plaintiff would
not be barred from establishing reasonable reliance. The appel-
late court affirmed.2 74
268. Id. at *4.
269. Id. at *7.
270. As part of the transfer of the super senior swap, the plaintiff agreed that:
Non-Reliance. It is acting for its own account, and it has made its own inde-
pendent decisions to enter into [the] Transaction and as to whether [the]
Transaction is appropriate or proper for it is based upon its own judgment
and upon advice from such advisers as it has deemed necessary. It is not rely-
ing on any communication (written or oral) of the other party as investment
advice or as a recommendation to enter into [the] Transaction; it being un-
derstood that information and explanations related to the terms and condi-
tions of a Transaction shall not be considered investment advice or a recom-
mendation to enter into [the] Transaction. No communication (written or
oral) received from the other party shall be deemed to be an assurance or
guarantee as to the expected results of [the] Transaction; and
Assessment and Understanding. It is capable of assessing the merits of and
understanding (on its own behalf or through independent professional ad-
vice), and understands and accepts, the terms, conditions and risks of [the]
Transaction. It is also capable of assuming, and assumes, the risks of [the]
Transaction.
Id. at *11-12.
271. Id. at *13.
272. Id. at *14, *16.
273. See id. at *16.
274. China Dev. Indus. Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 927 N.Y.S.2d 52, 53 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2011).
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C. SEC Enforcement Actions Brought Against Investment Banks
The SEC has brought enforcement actions against three in-
vestment banks in connection with the sale of synthetic CDOs.
All three have settled.
1. SEC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co. (ABACUS Synthetic CDO)
On April 16, 2010, the SEC brought an enforcement action
against Goldman Sachs and one of its employees, Fabrice Tourre,
relating to the ABACUS synthetic CDO."' According to the SEC,
the defendants violated Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933
as well as Rule 10b-5.276
The filing received substantial news coverage, in part because
it was the first high profile enforcement action brought by the
SEC following the financial crisis.2 77 In addition, the circumstanc-
es surrounding the filing were controversial in several respects.
First, the complaint was authorized by the SEC commissioners by
a split vote, which is highly unusual.2 78 Moreover, the split was
along party lines.279 Second, the filing apparently came as a com-
plete surprise to Goldman.280 Ordinarily, the SEC engages in set-
tlement negotiations with potential defendants before filing com-
plaints, so the SEC's departure from its standard practice in such
a high profile case was curious.281 And, finally, the timing of the
filing was seen by some as suspicious, coming several hours be-
fore the release of a report from the SEC's Inspector General that
was extremely critical of the SEC's response to a well-known
275. Complaint at 1, SEC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119802
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2010) (No. 10-cv-3229) [hereinafter Goldman, Sachs & Co. Complaint].
For additional discussion of the ABACUS synthetic CDO, see supra Part III.B.2.
276. Goldman, Sachs & Co. Complaint, supra note 275, at 3.
277. See, e.g., Kara Scannell, SEC Split on Goldman Case-3-2 Vote to Sue Could Polit-
icize Landmark Action; Key Panel at Firm Gave OK to Deal, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2010, at
Al.
278. Id.
279. The two Republican commissioners voted against the action, the two Democratic
commissioners voted in favor of the action, and the SEC Chair, a registered Independent,
cast the deciding vote in favor of filing the enforcement action. Id.
280. See Felix Salmon, Why Goldman Didn't See the SEC Suit Coming, REUTERS BLOG
(Apr. 19, 2010), http:/Iblogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/04/19/why-goldman-didnt-see-
the-sec-suit-coming.
281. See Brooke Masters, SEC Engages in High Risk Game, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2010),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b594015e-4bd4-1 ldf-a217-00144feab49a.html.
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Ponzi scheme."' Similarly, the SEC was criticized for timing the
filing of the suit to influence the then-ongoing Senate debate on
legislation that would eventually become the Dodd-Frank Act."
Although Goldman initially stated that it would fight the en-
forcement action, on July 15, 2010, Goldman entered into a $550
million settlement with the SEC,28 4 the result of another 3-2 split
vote by the SEC commissioners.2 " The settlement was approved
by Judge Barbara Jones of the Southern District of New York on
July 20, 2010.286
The settlement is a mixed bag, and each side could conceivably
claim victory. However, most commentators see the settlement as
a win for Goldman."' First, in the settlement, the SEC abandoned
its initial claim that Goldman violated Rule 10b-5, the general
anti-fraud provision of the federal securities laws.288 Instead, the
SEC pursued a Section 17(a) claim, which-because it does not
require proof of intentional misconduct-is seen as a lesser
charge to Rule 10b-5.28 ' The SEC's decision to give up the Rule
10b-5 claim could be viewed as a concession by the SEC that the
fraud case against Goldman was not as strong as it initially be-
lieved.
The terms of the settlement did not require Goldman to admit
guilt.2 8 This is not unusual; until recently, allowing a defendant
to state that it was neither admitting nor denying the allegations
282. See id.
283. See Cyrus Sanati, Schapiro Hits Back at G.O.P. Critics of Goldman Case, N.Y.
TIMES DEALBoOK (Apr. 21, 2010), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/04/21/schapiro-hits-
back-at-g-o-p-critics-of-goldman-case/?_r=0.
284. Goldman Sachs to Pay Record $550 Million to Settle SEC Charges Related to
Subprime Mortgage CDO, SEC Litigation Release No. 21,592 (July 15, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/itigation/litreleases/2010/lr2l592.htm.
285. Kara Scannell & Susanne Craig, SEC Split Over Goldman Deal, WALL ST. J., July
17, 2010, at Al.
286. SEC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119802, at *13 (S.D.N.Y.
July 20, 2010).
287. As two commentators noted, "[1]ike any settlement, each side appears to have giv-
en a little bit, although the Street consensus is that Goldman got off too easily." See Peter
J. Henning & Steven M. Davidoff, Weighing the Trade-Offs in the Goldman Settlement,
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (July 16, 2010), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/07/16/weighing-
the-trade-offs-in-the-goldman-settlement/?_r-0.
288. See Consent of Defendant Goldman, Sachs & Co. at 1-2, SEC v. Goldman, Sachs
& Co., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119802 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2010) (No. 10-cv-3229).
289. Id. at 1. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77q(2) (2012) (codifying section 17(2) claims), with
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013) (codifying Rule 100-5).
290. Consent of Defendant Goldman, Sachs & Co., supra note 288, at 1.
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in the complaint was standard practice for the SEC. However, in
this case, it is very clear that there were misleading statements
of material fact in the offering materials. Rather than admitting
that, Goldman was permitted to concede that the ABACUS offer-
ing materials contained "incomplete information."2 9 ' Moreover, in
its consent, Goldman stated that:
it was a mistake for the Goldman marketing materials to state that
the reference portfolio was "selected by" ACA Management LLC
without disclosing the role of Paulson & Co. Inc. in the portfolio se-
lection process and that Paulson's economic interests were adverse
to CDO investors. Goldman regrets that the marketing materials did
292
not contain that disclosure.
This kind of concession and apology is unusual and could be con-
sidered a win for the SEC. However, Goldman's acknowledgment
of a "mistake" is much less harmful that an acknowledgment of
fraud.
The SEC could also boast that the settlement included the
largest penalty the SEC has ever obtained.' However, prior to
the announcement of the settlement, many commentators had be-
lieved that Goldman would have to pay at least $1 billion in any
settlement, so the $550 million payment was seen by many as a
"steal." 4 Similarly, the SEC obtained only minor ancillary reme-
dies from Goldman 295 and did not obtain more serious undertak-
ings from Goldman that would have impacted the management or
governance of the investment bank. The lower-than-expected set-
tlement amount, coupled with the minor ancillary remedies, was
interpreted by some as additional evidence of the weakness of the
SEC's case against Goldman.296
291. Id. at 2.
292. Id.
293. See Susanne Craig & Kara Scannell, Goldman Settles Its Battle with SEC, WALL
ST. J., July 16, 2010, at Al.
294. Id.
295. For example, the settlement required Goldman, for a period of three years, to (1)
modify the process of how mortgage-related products were approved; (2) have all market-
ing materials for mortgage-related securities reviewed by Goldman's legal or compliance
department; (3) have certain marketing materials reviewed by Goldman's outside counsel;
and (4) train new employees working with mortgage-related securities in the appropriate
parts of the federal securities laws. Consent of Defendant Goldman, Sachs & Co., supra
note 288, at 4-6.
296. See, e.g., Scannell & Craig, supra note 285.
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The SEC's case against Fabrice Tourre, the Goldman employee
who was responsible for overseeing the ABACUS transaction, did
not settle.2 Following a trial, the jury found Mr. Tourre liable for
six counts of fraud, leading some commentators to conclude that
the SEC was too easy on Goldman.2 98
2. SEC v. JP Morgan (Squared CDO 2007-1 Synthetic CDO)
On June 21, 2011, the SEC filed a complaint against JP Mor-
gan and simultaneously entered into a $153.6 million settlement
with JP Morgan,' relating to allegations of misconduct very sim-
ilar to those found in the ABACUS synthetic CDO.o Specifically,
the SEC alleged that JP Morgan structured and sold the $1.1 bil-
lion Squared CDO 2007-1 to investors without disclosing that a
large hedge fund, Magnetar Capital LLC,'01 with interests ad-
verse to the long investors, was involved in selecting the refer-
ence portfolio for the synthetic CDO.o20 The Squared offering ma-
terials stated that the reference portfolio would be selected by an
independent entity, GSCP L.P., an investment advisor experi-
297. See Justin Baer et al., 'Fab' Trader Liable in Fraud, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 2013, at
Al.
298. Id.
299. Complaint at 1, SEC v. JP Morgan Sec., LLC, (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2011) (No. 11-cv-
4206) [hereinafter JP Morgan Complaint]; see JP Morgan Securities to Pay $153.6 Million
to Settle SEC Charges of Misleading Investors in CDO Tied to U.S. Housing Market, SEC
Litigation Release No. 22,008 (June 21, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
litreleases/2011/lr22008.htm. At the same time, the SEC filed a complaint against an em-
ployee of the collateral agent, Edward S. Steffelin, alleging that he also committed fraud.
See SEC Litigation Release No. 22,008, supra; James B. Stewart, Another Fumble by the
SEC on Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2012, at Bi. Even after the SEC settled charges
against JP Morgan, it continued the enforcement action against Mr. Steffelin. In 2012, the
SEC dismissed all charges against Mr. Steffelin with prejudice. Stewart, supra.
300. See supra Part III.B.2. There are several differences between the ABACUS and
Squared synthetic CDOs at issue in this case. For example, Magnetar, unlike Paulson in
ABACUS, did take an equity position in the synthetic CDO. See Complaint, supra note
299, at 2. However, the $8.9 million in equity was much less than Magnetar's $600 million
short position in Squared. See id. Therefore, even though it owned the equity, Magnetar
had greater incentive to select risky mortgage-related securities for the reference portfolio.
In addition, JP Morgan, unlike Goldman in ABACUS, retained the super senior tranche
portion of the synthetic CDO. See id. at 1-3. Therefore, when the synthetic CDO crashed,
JP Morgan reportedly lost approximately $900 million. See id. at 3.
301. Magnetar Capital has been the focus of a series of articles on the financial crisis
published by ProPublica, the investigative journalism website. To learn more about Mag-
netar, see Jesse Eisinger & Jake Bernstein, The Magnetar Trade: How One Hedge Fund
Helped Keep the Bubble Going, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 9, 2010, 12:00 PM), http://www.propub
lica.orglarticle/the-magnetar-trade-how-one-hedge-fund-helped-keep-the-housing-bubble-
going.
302. See JP Morgan Complaint, supra note 299, at 2.
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enced in assessing credit risk, and did not reveal the significant
participation of Magnetar.o3 Approximately $150 million of notes
were sold to approximately fifteen institutional investors, who
eventually lost their entire investment."14 According to the SEC,
JP Morgan violated Section 17(a)(2) and (3) of the Securities Act
because it "negligently misrepresent[ed] a key deal term, namely,
who selected the collateral."0 '
In the settlement, JP Morgan (1) stated that it was neither
admitting nor denying the allegations of the complaint; (2) agreed
to a permanent injunction against violating Section 17(a)(2) and
(3); (3) agreed to make a payment of $153.6 million, most of which
was paid over to the fifteen investors who lost their investments
in the Squared synthetic CDO; and (4) agreed to certain prophy-
lactic actions intended to improve disclosure and compliance with
the federal securities laws.306 The settlement was approved by
Judge Richard M. Berman of the Southern District of New York
on June 29, 2011.307
Once again, the settlement could be seen as a win for the de-
fendant, especially when compared to the Goldman settlement.0 s
First, unlike the ABACUS transaction, the SEC never alleged
that JP Morgan violated Rule 10b-5 or engaged in intentionally
fraudulent conduct. Instead, the SEC limited its charge to Section
17(a). Moreover, JP Morgan did not have to make a statement of
regret as Goldman was required to do in the ABACUS settle-
ment. JP Morgan did have to agree to some undertakings similar
to those made by Goldman, but like the ABACUS settlement,
these ancillary remedies are not burdensome.' Finally, the dol-
lar amount of the settlement-far less than the $550 million paid
by Goldman-does not seem to be particularly large for a global
financial institution.1 0
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 3.
306. See Consent of Defendant JP Morgan Sec. LLC. at 1-6, SEC v. JP Morgan Sec.
LLC (S.D.N.Y June 21, 2011) (No. 11-cv-4206).
307. See Final Judgment as to Defendant JP Morgan Sec. LLC, SEC v. JP Morgan Sec.
LLC (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2011) (No. 11-cv-4206).
308. See supra Part IV.C.1.
309. See supra Part IV.C.1.
310. See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
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3. SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. (Class V Funding III
Synthetic CDO)
On October 19, 2011, the SEC filed a complaint against
Citigroup Global Markets and simultaneously entered into a $285
million settlement with Citigroup."' The complaint involved alle-
gations of misconduct similar to those found in the Hudson syn-
thetic CDO previously discussed."' Specifically, the SEC alleged
that Citigroup failed to disclose to purchasers of notes in the
Class V Funding III synthetic CDO that Citigroup played a sig-
nificant role in selecting the mortgage-related securities for the
reference portfolio and that they had a short position on the
transaction."' The offering materials stated that the reference
portfolio would be selected by Credit Suisse Alternative Capital,
Inc., an investor advisor experienced in analyzing credit risk, and
did not disclose Citigroup's role in the selection process. When
the synthetic CDO failed several months later, long investors lost
several hundred million dollars, but Citigroup realized profits of
approximately $160 million due to its short position on the syn-
thetic CDO.
The terms of the Citigroup settlement appear very similar to
the terms of the JP Morgan settlement.3 16 According to the pro-
posed settlement, Citigroup would (1) neither admit nor deny the
allegations of the complaint; (2) agree to a permanent injunction
against future violations of Sections 17(a)(2) and (3) of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933; (3) agree to make a payment of $285 million,
some of which could be paid over to the investors who lost their
311. Complaint, SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (No. 11-cv-7387) [hereinafter Citigroup Complaint]; Memorandum by Plaintiff SEC
in Support of Proposed Settlement, SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d
328 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 11-cv-7388) [hereinafter Proposed Settlement]. Citigroup to Pay
$285 Million to Settle SEC Charges for Misleading Investors About CDO Company Profit-
ed From Proprietary Short Position Citigroup Employee Sued for His Role in Transaction,
SEC Litigation Release No. 22,134, (Oct. 19, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/litiga
tion/litreleases/2011/lr22134.htm.
312. See supra Part III.B.1.
313. Citigroup Complaint, supra note 311, at 2. The SEC also sued a Citigroup employ-
ee for his role in structuring and marketing the Class V Funding III Synthetic CDO. Id. at
1. Following a jury trial, the Citigroup employee was found not liable on all claims. Brian
Stoker Found Not Liable, SEC Litigation Release No. 22,541, (Nov. 21, 2012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2012/lr2254l.htm.
314. Citigroup Complaint, supra note 311, at 2.
315. Id. at 3.
316. See supra note 306 and accompanying text.
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investments in the Class V Funding III synthetic CDO; and (4)
agree to certain prophylactic actions intended to improve disclo-
sure and compliance with the federal securities laws.'
In an extremely unusual move, the settlement was rejected by
Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York."' According to the court, the settlement was
"neither fair, nor reasonable, nor adequate, nor in the public in-
terest."3 1 ' The court ordered the case to go to trial.320 The SEC and
Citigroup appealed the decision,3 2' and in February 2013, the Sec-
ond Circuit heard arguments on whether Judge Rakoff exceeded
his authority by rejecting the settlement.32 2 Until the Second Cir-
cuit issues its opinion, the trial will be stayed.32 3
V. SYNTHETIC CDOs POST-FINANCIAL CRISIS: CONFLICT OF
INTEREST RULES
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (the "Dodd-Frank Act") includes a provision that prohibits
certain conflicts of interests in the creation of derivatives, includ-
ing synthetic CDOs.324
A. The Dodd-Frank Act's Conflict of Interest Prohibition
The Dodd-Frank Act includes a provision regulating the crea-
tion of synthetic CDOs. According to Section 621(a):
[a]n underwriter, placement agent, initial purchaser, or sponsor, or
any affiliate or subsidiary of any such entity, of an asset-backed se-
curity (as such term is defined in section 3 of the Securities Ex-
317. Proposed Settlement, supra note 311, at 3-4.
318. SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
319. Id. at 332. Following the order rejecting the settlement, the SEC and Citigroup
moved for a stay of proceedings pending resolution of its appeal. The Second Circuit
granted the stay. See SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 673 F.3d 158, 169 (2d Cir. 2012).
320. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 335.
321. See SEC's (1) Unopposed Emergency Motion to Stay the Proceedings Below Pend-
ing Appeal, or, in the Alternative, for a Temporary Stay, and (2) Unopposed Motion to Ex-
pedite the Appeal at 1, SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 673 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2012)
(No. 11-5227).
322. See Peter Lattman, Judge's Rejection of Citigroup Deal is Heard on Appeal, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 9, 2013, at B2.
323. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 673 F.3d at 169.
324. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 621, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2a(a) (2012)).
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change Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c), which for purposes of this section
shall include a synthetic asset-backed security), shall not, at any
time for a period ending on the date that is one year after the date of
the first closing of the sale of the asset-backed security, engage in
any transaction that would involve or result in any material conflict
of interest with respect to any investor in a transaction arising out of
325
such activity.
By focusing on "material conflicts of interest," this provision is a
direct response to claims that investment banks sold synthetic
CDOs that were designed to fail, as well as claims that invest-
ment banks engaged in bad behavior that was unfair to their cli-
ents, such as shorting the synthetic CDO while at the same time
promoting a long investment to their clients. In other words, the
statute's focus is on protecting long investors, the investors who
purchased the synthetic CDO's notes.
The Dodd-Frank Act also creates three exceptions to this pro-
hibition against conflicts of interest: (1) certain "risk-mitigating
hedging activities;" 2 (2) certain liquidity commitments;327 and (3)
"bona fide market-making" in the security.
While it set forth the broad contours of the prohibition, Con-
gress did not provide much detail in Section 621. For example,
Section 621 does not define "material conflict of interest," the
most important term in the statute.3 2' Nor does Section 621 set
forth the limits of the statutory exceptions.3 3' Rather, Congress
delegated the specifics to the SEC, directing the SEC to issue
325. Id. § 621(a).
326. The statute permits conflicts of interest if they are:
risk-mitigating hedging activities in connection with positions or holdings
arising out of the underwriting, placement, initial purchase, or sponsorship of
an asset-backed security, provided that such activities are designed to reduce
the specific risks to the underwriter, placement agent, initial purchaser, or
sponsor associated with positions or holdings arising out of such underwrit-
ing, placement initial purchaser, or sponsorship.
Id. § 621(c)(1).
327. The statute permits conflicts of interest if they are "purchases or sales of asset-
backed securities made pursuant to and consistent with commitments of the underwriter,
placement agent, initial purchaser, or sponsor, or any affiliate of subsidiary of any such
entity, to provide liquidity for the asset-backed security." See id. § 621(c)(2)(A) (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 77z-2a(c)(2)(A) (2012)).
328. The statute permits conflicts of interest if they are "purchases or sales of asset-
backed securities made pursuant to and consistent with bona fide market-making in the
asset-backed security." Id. § 621(c)(2)(B).
329. See id. § 621.
330. See id.
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rules enacting Section 62133' and delaying the effectiveness of
Section 621 until the SEC adopted those final rules.33 2
The SEC proposed the rules in September 2011.333 However,
even after extending the comment period twice, the SEC has yet
to issue final rules under Section 621. Therefore, the prohibition
on conflicts of interest is not yet effective. Although not final, the
proposed rules offer the best evidence of the SEC's likely ap-
proach, and so the following section provides a quick summary of
the proposed rules and related Proposing Release.
B. The SEC's Proposed Conflict of Interest Rules
Proposed Rule 127B is the SEC's attempt to implement Section
621. Somewhat surprisingly, the proposed rule does not provide
any meaningful detail. Proposed Rule 127B essentially restates
Section 621.' The details are provided in the thirty-one-page
331. Congress directed the SEC to issue the rules within 270 days of the passage of the
Dodd-Frank Act. Id. § 621(b). However, the SEC did not meet this deadline and the rules
were proposed on September 28, 2011, more than a year after the passage of the Dodd-
Frank Act on July 21, 2010. Prohibition Against Conflicts of Interest in Certain Securiti-
zations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-65,355, 76 Fed. Reg. 60,320 (Sept. 2011) [hereinaf-
ter Proposing Release].
332. According to Section 621, the section "shall take effect on the effective date of final
rules issued by the Commission under subsection(b)." § 621(b).
333. See Proposing Release, supra note 331.
334. See id. at 60,350.
335. Proposed Rule 127B states in its entirety:
Rule 127B Conflicts of interest relating to certain securitizations.
(a) Unlawful activity. An underwriter, placement agent, initial pur-
chaser, or sponsor, or any affiliate or subsidiary of any such entity, of
an asset-backed security (as such term is defined in section 3 of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 . .. , which for the purposes of this rule
shall include a synthetic asset-backed security), shall not, at any time
for a period ending on the date that is one year after the date of the
first closing of the sale of the asset-backed security [or synthetic CDO],
engage in any transaction that would involve or result in any material
conflict of interest with respect to any investor in a transaction arising
out of such activity.
(b) Excepted activity. The following activities shall not be prohibited by
paragraph (a) of this section:
(1) Risk-mitigating hedging activities. Risk-mitigating hedging
activities in connection with positions or holdings arising out the
underwriting, placement, initial purchase, or sponsorship of an
asset-backed security, provided that such activities are designed
to reduce the specific risks to the underwriter, placement agent,
initial purchaser, or sponsorship associated with such positions
or holdings; or
(2) Liquidity commitment. Purchases or sales of asset-backed
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proposing release ("Proposing Release").3 36 While the Proposing
Release includes guidance and numerous examples of how the
proposed rule would operate, it also includes 120 separate re-
quests for comments or additional information, indicating, per-
haps, SEC uncertainty in regulating conflicts of interests.3
1. Scope of Proposed Rule
According to the Proposing Release, in order for the proposed
rule to apply, the transaction "must involve (1) [c]overed persons,
(2) covered products, (3) a covered timeframe, (4) covered conflicts
and (5) a 'material conflict of interest."'"" The following is a short
description of the scope of the proposed rule.
"Covered persons" are entities that "typically have substantial
roles in the assembly, packaging and sale" of asset-backed securi-
ties and synthetic CDOs; that is, underwriters, placement agents,
initial purchasers, and sponsors.' It is not clear whether collat-
eral managers or portfolio selection agents would constitute "cov-
ered persons" under the proposed rule, and the SEC asked for
guidance on whether they should be included.4 o In addition, it
does not appear that hedge funds meet the definition of covered
persons.
"Covered products" include asset-backed securities, defined
under the federal securities laws, and synthetic CDOs. 34 1 Pro-
posed Rule 127B does not define synthetic CDOs; according to the
securities made pursuant to and consistent with commitments
of the underwriter, placement agent, initial purchaser, or spon-
sor, or any affiliate or subsidiary of such entity, to provide li-
quidity for the asset-backed security; or
(3) Bona fide market-making. Purchases or sales of asset-backed
securities made pursuant to and consistent with bona fide mar-
ket-making in the asset-backed security.
Id.
336. Id.
337. See, e.g., id.
338. Id. at 60,325.
339. See id. at 60,325-26
340. See id.
341. An "asset-backed security" is a "fixed-income or other security collateralized by
any type of self-liquidating financial asset . . . that allows the holder of the security to re-
ceive payments that depend primarily on cash flows from the asset. . .. " Id. at 60,326
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 79c(a)(70)(A) (2012)).
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Proposing Release, it was unnecessary to do so because the "term
is commonly used and understood by market participants."34 2
The "covered timeframe" of Proposed Rule 127B ends one year
following the first sale of the synthetic CDO.343 In other words,
assuming the transaction is covered by the rule, the investment
bank would not be able to engage in prohibited conduct for one
year following the first sale of the notes.344
"Covered conflicts" mean conflicts that arise between a covered
person and an investor in the synthetic CDO."4 The Proposing
Release expressly states that a covered conflict does not include
any conflicts that are exclusively between covered persons or ex-
clusively between investors.346 This approach is consistent with
congressional intent to protect the purchasers of the notes in the
synthetic CDOs. The Proposing Release also provides two other
carve-outs from the definition of "covered conflict."347
Finally, there must be a "material conflict of interest."48 The
SEC chose not to define the term "material conflict of interest" in
its proposed rules. 349 According to the Proposing Release:
[A]ny attempt to precisely define this term ... might be both over-
and under-inclusive in terms of identifying those types of material
conflicts of interest . . . that Section 27B was intended to prohibit,
especially given the complex and evolving nature of the securitiza-
tion markets, the range of participants involved, and the various ac-
tivities performed by those participants.3 5 0
Instead, the SEC provided interpretive guidance, setting forth a
two-pronged test for material conflict of interest:
(1) Either:
(A) a securitization participant would benefit directly or indi-
rectly from the actual, anticipated or potential (1) Adverse per-
342. Id.
343. See id. at 60,327.
344. See id.
345. Id. at 60,328.
346. Id.
347. The two other carve-outs are if the conflict (1) did not arise as a result of or in
connection with the related ABS transaction; or (2) did not arise as a result of or in con-
nection with "engaging in a transaction," such as taking the short side on a transaction or
choosing the reference portfolio in a synthetic CDO. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 60,329.
350. Id.
2014] 717
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
formance of the asset pool supporting or referenced by the rel-
evant ABS, (2) loss of principal, monetary default or early
amortization event on the ABS, or (3) decline in the market
value of the relevant ABS (where these are discussed below,
any such transaction will be referred to as a "short transac-
tion"); or
(B) a securitization participant, who directly or indirectly con-
trols the structure of the relevant ABS or the selection of as-
sets underlying the ABS, would benefit directly or indirectly
from fees or other forms of remuneration, or the promise of fu-
ture business, fees, or other forms of remuneration, as a result
of allowing a third party, directly or indirectly, to structure the
relevant ABS or select assets underlying the ABS in a way
that facilitates or creates an opportunity for that third party to
benefit from a short transaction as described above; and
(2) there is a "substantial likelihood" that a "reasonable" investor
would consider the conflict important to his or her investment deci-
3511
sion (including a decision to retain the security or not).
Note that the first part of the two part test does not require
that the synthetic CDO be designed to fail for the conduct to be a
material conflict of interest.' Instead, the guidance focuses on
whether the securitization participant would benefit from the
transaction, not the intent of the securitization participant."
For the second part of the test, the guidance indicates that the
SEC is drawing from the definition of materiality found in the
federal securities laws.354 That definition is based in part on an
understanding that materiality is contextual in nature." That
would mean, for example, that the materiality determination of a
conflict of interest would not be made in isolation, but would be
made after reviewing the marketing materials and all other in-
formation known to reasonable investors. However, the guidance
351. Id.
352. Id. at 60,330 (stating that "[iut would not be necessary for a securitization partici-
pant to intentionally design an ABS to fail or default in order to trigger the rule's prohibi-
tion.").
353. Id.
354. Id. at 60,332. The test for materiality is whether there is a substantial likelihood
that a reasonable investor would consider [the information] important in deciding how to
act. Compare id. (stating that generally the proposed interpretation of materiality is
"whether there is a substantial liklihood that a reasonable investor would consider the
issue important to his or her investment decision"), with TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway,
Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (stating that "an omitted fact is material if there is a sub-
stantial liklihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding
how to vote").
355. See Proposing Release, supra note 331, at 60,331-32.
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states that the use of the materiality definition "is not intended to
suggest that a transaction otherwise prohibited under the pro-
posed rule would be permitted if there were adequate disclosure
by the securitization participant."' This language could be inter-
preted to mean that investors would be unable to waive conflicts
of interests under Proposed Rule 127B. The Proposing Release
seeks comments regarding the effect of conflict of interest disclo-
sures on the definition of materiality.5
2. Statutory Exceptions
The Proposed Rule includes the same three exceptions set forth
in the Dodd-Frank Act.' One of them-the risk-mitigating hedg-
ing activities exception-is of particular importance to synthetic
CDOs. The "risk-mitigating hedging activities" exception is in-
tended to permit securitization participants to engage in hedging
activities to reduce risk from a position arising out of the creation
of the synthetic CDO. Hedging will be permitted to avoid a loss,
but not to earn a profit.' According to the Proposing Release, the
exception is "not intended to permit speculative trading masked
as risk-mitigating hedging activities."' Of course, it will often be
difficult to ascertain whether an investment bank's activities con-
stitute permitted hedging or prohibited speculation.
356. Id. at 60,332.
357. For example, the Proposing Release requests "comment as to whether and to what
extent adequate disclosure of a material conflict of interest should affect the treatment
under the proposed rule of an otherwise prohibited transaction." Id.
358. Id. at 60,333.
359. Proposed Rule 127B(b)(1) permits:
Risk-mitigating hedging activities in connection with positions or holdings
arising out of the underwriting, placement, initial purchase, or sponsorship of
an asset-backed security, provided that such activities are designed to reduce
the specific risks to the underwriter, placement agent, initial purchaser, or
sponsor associated with such positions or holdings.
Id. at 60,350.
360. See id. at 60,334.
361. Id.
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C. Assessment of the Proposed Conflict of Interest Rules and
Synthetic CDOs
The proposed conflict of interest rules, if adopted, would seem
to prohibit the most notorious examples of bad behavior by in-
vestment banks in selling synthetic CDOs.362
For example, the conflict of interest rules would prohibit an in-
vestment bank from betting against its client in a synthetic CDO,
at least when it does not have any exposure to the synthetic CDO
or the assets in the reference portfolio."' According to the Propos-
ing Release, by entering into the credit default swap, the invest-
ment bank would be engaging in a material conflict of interest to
the detriment of the long investors.36 4 However, if the investment
bank contemporaneously entered into an off-setting credit default
swap transaction with a third party, this transaction would fall
within the "risk-mitigating hedging activity" exception to the con-
flict of interest rules." The Proposing Release makes clear that
the exception would not be available if the investment bank or
the third party selected the securities for the reference portfolio. 366
In other words, the conflicts of interest rules would have prevent-
ed Goldman from taking the short position in the ABACUS syn-
thetic CDO discussed above."
The conflict of interest rules would also prohibit an investment
bank from going short in a synthetic CDO to reduce its long expo-
sure to the reference portfolio. According to the Proposing Re-
lease, this balance sheet synthetic CDO would also violate the
rules.' Because the investment bank would benefit from a de-
cline in the value of the assets in the reference portfolio, by enter-
ing into the credit default swap, the investment bank would be
362. The general conflict of interest rules appear to bar the kinds of misconduct seen in
the ABACUS and Hudson synthetic CDOs. However, the general rules are subject to sev-
eral exceptions that might permit the conflict of interest. Thus, whether or not the in-
vestment bank could engage in the conduct depends upon the actual facts of the transac-
tion.
363. See Proposing Release, supra note 331, at 60,338.
364. See id.
365. See id.
366. See id.
367. See supra Part III.B.2.
368. Proposing Release, supra note 331, at 60,347.
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engaging in a material conflict of interest.' Moreover, according
to the SEC, this kind of transaction would not fall under the
"risk-mitigating hedging activity" exception because the hedge
was for an existing long position, rather than for a long position
created by its underwriting activities."'0 Thus, the conflict of in-
terest rules would have prevented Goldman's short in the Hudson
synthetic CDO discussed above.'
In addition, the conflict of interest rules would prohibit an in-
vestment bank from permitting a short investor to select the ref-
erence portfolio.3 72 Thus, the conflict of interest rules would have
prevented Paulson's participation in the selection of the portfolio
in the ABACUS synthetic CDO previously discussed. 3 73
VI. ADDITIONAL REGULATION OF SYNTHETIC CDOs Is NECESSARY
Following the financial crisis, synthetic CDOs became famous
because of the highly publicized bad behavior of investment
banks.374 This attention has led to fraud actions against several
investment banks and proposed conflict of interest rules govern-
ing the sale of synthetic CDOs. 7 The emphasis on penalizing and
preventing investment bank misconduct is unfortunate because it
has taken attention away from the real problem: the synthetic
CDO itself. This section argues for increased regulation of syn-
thetic CDOs to address the inherent dangers of spreading risk
throughout the financial system. First, focusing on fraud in the
sale of synthetic CDOs is the wrong approach. Second, the pro-
posed conflict of interest rules do not go far enough to address the
dangers of synthetic CDOs. Finally, this section concludes by urg-
ing regulators to give serious consideration to banning the sale of
all synthetic CDOs.
369. See id. at 60,329.
370. Id. at 60,338.
371. See supra Part III.B.1.
372. See Proposing Release, supra note 331, at 60,338.
373. See supra Part III.B.2.
374. See, e.g., Stephanie Tsao, Developments in Banking and Financial Law: 2007-
2008: VII. Managing Investment Banks During the Mortgage Crisis, 27 REV. BANKING &
FIN. L. 323, 325 (2008) ("Despite the mounting warning signs, investment banks continued
to underwrite risky mortgage-based securities backed by subprime loans.").
375. See supra Part IV.
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A. Relying on Antifraud Provisions to Adequately Regulate the
Sale of Synthetic CDOs Is the Wrong Approach
1. In General, Investors in Synthetic CDOs Were Not Defrauded
Following the financial crisis, the conventional wisdom has
been that investment banks defrauded their clients when they
structured and sold synthetic CDOs.376 There is no doubt that
several investment banks engaged in bad behavior and treated
long investors unfairly. But can it really be said that these long
investors of synthetic CDOs were defrauded within the meaning
of the securities laws? In general, the answer is no.
As the previous discussion of synthetic CDO litigation has
shown, plaintiffs have generally not been successful in fraud ac-
tions against the investment banks."' A review of these cases
shows that there are two particular obstacles. First, the long in-
vestor may not be able to show that the investment bank made a
false or misleading statement of material fact. Second, even if the
long investor is able to show that the investment bank made a
false or misleading statement of material fact, the long investor
will often not be able to show that it reasonably relied on the
false or misleading statement.
Certainly, in some synthetic CDOs, the investment banks
made false or misleading statements of material fact. For exam-
ple, the ABACUS marketing materials falsely stated that the ref-
erence portfolio was selected by a portfolio manager, when it was
in fact selected, at least in part, by Paulson, the short investor.7 8
However, in other cases, it might be difficult for the plaintiff to
show fraud because (1) the investment bank actually disclosed
the information; (2) the investment bank did not have a duty to
disclose the information; or (3) the investment bank's undisclosed
belief in the quality (or lack of quality) of the security is non-
actionable."'
It is a widely accepted belief that investment banks lied about
the synthetic CDOs to their clients.8 o However, at least in some
376. Tsao, supra note 374, at 325.
377. See supra Part IV.B.
378. See supra Part III.B.2.
379. See supra Part VI.A.
380. See Tsao, supra note 374, at 325; see, e.g., Robert Schmidt et al., Goldman Sachs
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of the synthetic CDOs discussed, the investment banks actually
disclosed their bad behavior in the marketing materials.as' For
example, in the Hudson synthetic CDO, Goldman disclosed that
it was taking the entire short position, that Goldman was select-
ing the reference portfolio, and that the reference portfolio con-
sisted almost entirely of poorly rated RMBSs.' Goldman's behav-
ior in pushing a deal to long investors while at the same time
betting against the transaction can be seen as unfair to its cli-
ents, but so long as Goldman made full disclosure, there is no
fraud.8
On the other hand, the plaintiff may argue that the investment
bank committed fraud because it did not fully disclose certain
material information. For the plaintiff to recover, it will have to
show that there was a duty to disclose, which may not always be
easy to do. For example, in the Dodona I, LLC v. Goldman Sachs
case, the court found that Goldman did not have a duty to dis-
close its strategy to reduce its long exposure in mortgage-related
securities.384 To many, this may be seen as a surprising result be-
cause this is certainly information that long investors would want
to know before investing in the synthetic CDO. However, just be-
cause information is material does not mean it must be disclosed.
There must be an independent duty to disclose, which the court
did not find in that case. More broadly, while a fiduciary duty
owed to the long investors would be sufficient to establish a duty
to disclose, the investment banks did not owe a fiduciary duty to
their clients. And, in any case, the long investors in synthetic
CDOs disclaimed the existence of fiduciary duties.
Some long investors have also argued that investment banks
committed fraud when they sold synthetic CDO notes that the in-
vestment banks "knew" were very likely to default. Can an in-
vestment bank be liable for its undisclosed opinion about the
quality of the securities it is marketing? Dodona I, LLC appears
Misled Congress After Duping Clients Over CDOs, Levin Says, BLoOMBERG (Apr. 14,
2011), http://www.bloomberg.cominews/print/2011-04-14/goldman-sachs-misled-congress-
after-duping-clients-over-cdos-levin-says.html.
381. See supra Part IV.B.1.
382. See supra Part IV.B.1.
383. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1977) ("[T]he Court re-
peatedly has described the 'fundamental purpose' of the Act as implementing a 'philosophy
of full disclosure'; once full and fair disclosure has occurred, the fairness of the terms of
the transaction is at most a tangential concern of the statute.").
384. 847 F. Supp. 2d 624, 646.
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to say yes, but a closer reading of the case indicates that the court
actually sidestepped the question."
The Dodona I, LLC court's hesitancy to judicially impose a
general duty on investment banks to disclose their beliefs about
the quality of the securities they are marketing is understanda-
ble. Courts have been confronted with a similar argument in a
different context, but refused to impose a duty. In the past, plain-
tiffs have argued that Rule 10b-5 requires companies to disclose
forward-looking statements or issue projections.38 6 These claims
are based on the rule that a corporation, once it makes disclosure,
must be completely accurate in its disclosure."' So it could be ar-
gued, for example, that a company that discloses its operating re-
sults, knowing that its results are likely to be worse in the future,
must disclose its projections at the same time-in order to avoid
making a misleading statement of material fact in violation of
Rule 10b-5.38 ' The courts, however, have not embraced this argu-
ment. The courts have not wanted to turn Rule 10b-5, a fraud
provision, into a disclosure provision."' According to the courts, if
Congress (or the SEC) wants to expand the line item disclosure
requirements of the federal securities laws to include the issu-
ance of projections, it knows how to do so."' For the same rea-
sons, courts would be hesitant to impose a duty on investment
banks to issue statements of opinion when marketing synthetic
CDOs.
Moreover, if courts were to impose such a duty on investment
banks, it would be difficult to limit its application to the facts of
synthetic CDOs. Would a company selling securities in a public
offering have to disclose its opinion on the quality of the common
stock? Such a result seems especially wrong, given that the phi-
losophy underlying the Securities Act of 1933 is one of disclosure,
and not one of merit review. So long as the investor has sufficient
information to form an opinion about the quality of the securities,
the goals of the federal securities laws has been met.
385. See supra Part IV.B.1.
386. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 287, 291-92 (7th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1982).
387. See id. at 292.
388. See id. at 289, 291-92.
389. See id. at 293.
390. See, e.g., Walker v. Action Indus., Inc., 802 F.2d 703, 709 (4th Cir. 1986).
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Finally, permitting plaintiffs to make arguments that an in-
vestment bank committed fraud by failing to disclose its opinion
about the quality of the investment would seem to run afoul of
the Supreme Court's reasoning in Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v.
Sandberg."' In Virginia Bankshares, bank shareholders were
asked to approve a merger.39 2 The bank's board of directors stated
in the proxy materials that it approved the merger "because it
provides an opportunity for the Bank's public shareholder to
achieve a high value for their shares.""' According to the plaintiff,
the real reason the board members approved the merger was to
retain their seats on the board.394 The plaintiff sued for fraud, ar-
guing that the statement of opinion was actionable because the
board did not actually believe what it said."' The court held that
statements of opinion or belief could be actionable under the fed-
eral securities laws, but only if the plaintiff could show that both
(1) the speaker did not actually believe the expressed opinion;
and (2) the subject matter underlying the opinion is false."' In
other words, if the merger consideration really was "high," but
the board did not believe it, the plaintiff would not be able to re-
cover.
The holding was primarily based on the United States Su-
preme Court's concern for the dangers of "vexatious litigation," as
expressed in its earlier case of Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, that could arise if plaintiffs were permitted to sue for the
mere subjective disbelief of a stated belief or opinion, standing
alone."' The Court reasoned that "to recognize liability on mere
disbelief or undisclosed motive without any demonstration that
the proxy statement was false or misleading about its subject
would authorize .. . litigation confined solely to what one skepti-
cal court spoke of as the 'impurities' of a director's 'unclean
heart."'"9 The court concluded that "the temptation to rest an
otherwise nonexistent [fraud] action on psychological enquiry
alone would threaten just the sort of strike suits and attrition by
391. 501 U.S. 1083 (1991).
392. Id. at 1088.
393. Id. at 1090.
394. Id. at 1088-89.
395. Id.
396. Id. at 1096.
397. Id. at 1092 (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 743
(1975)).
398. Id. at 1096 (quoting Stedman v. Storer, 306 F. Supp. 881, 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)).
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discovery that Blue Chip Stamps sought to discourage.""" Allow-
ing plaintiffs to sue investment banks for selling synthetic CDOs
that they allegedly "knew" would fail raises the very same con-
cerns expressed in Virginia Bankshares.
Even if long investors are successful in showing a false or mis-
leading statement of material fact, it will often be difficult for the
plaintiffs to show that they reasonably relied on the fraud. In the
above discussion of synthetic CDO cases, several courts-
especially New York state courts-did not seem readily disposed
to accept arguments that the sophisticated long investors had
been defrauded.400 The long investors of synthetic CDOs were
large institutional investors, such as banks, pension funds, hedge
funds, and insurance companies, all of whom were sophisticated
market participants. The sales of the notes were heavily negoti-
ated with the purchasers typically represented by pre-eminent
corporate law firms. As part of these private transactions, the
purchasers typically disclaimed reliance on statements not ap-
pearing in the final offering circular or provided "big boy" letters,
indicating that they were able to make investment decisions on
their own, without the advice of the investment banks. As previ-
ously shown, the combination of these factors substantially un-
dercuts most claims that long investors were defrauded by the
investment banks.
2. SEC Enforcement Actions Will Not Deter Misconduct by
Investment Banks
The SEC may be more successful in its enforcement actions
than private plaintiffs because the SEC is not required to show
reasonable reliance.40 1 However, it can legitimately be asked why
the SEC should expend scarce enforcement resources to bring ac-
tions to recover losses402 for the benefit of sophisticated institu-
399. Id.
400. See supra Part IV.B.
401. Nor does the SEC need to show scienter, loss caution, or damages. See supra Part
IV.A.1.
402. Under the "Fair Funds" provision of the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC is authorized to
distribute any civil penalties it obtained from defendants to the victims of the fraud. See
15 U.S.C. § 7246(a) (2012). The SEC distributed the civil penalties it received in the set-
tlements with Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, and Citigroup to the investors in the synthetic
CDOs. See David S. Hilzenrath, Citigroup Has Agreed to Pay $285M to Investors in Negli-
gence Suit, SEC Says, WASH. POST (Oct. 19, 2011), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/20
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tional investors who chose to invest in complicated derivatives in
the hopes of receiving high returns. The SEC prides itself on be-
ing the "investor's advocate," but it is hard to understand why the
banks, pension funds, and insurance companies who invested in
synthetic CDOs need the SEC to be their advocate.
The SEC may argue that the reason for bringing the enforce-
ment actions against investment banks was to deter fraud, not to
compensate the long investors in the synthetic CDOs. However,
that argument is a weak one.40 ' The fines paid by investment
banks could not possibly be seen by any of the investment banks
as significant deterrents. After all, although $550 million-the
settlement paid by Goldman in connection with the ABACUS
synthetic CDO-is certainly an enormous amount of money on an
absolute basis, Goldman had revenues of $39.16 billion in 2010
(the year it entered into the settlement) and earnings of $8.35 bil-
lion in 2010.404 To large investment banks, these SEC fines would
be a drop in the bucket. Similarly, the ancillary remedies imposed
by the SEC are not so burdensome as to be avoided by investment
banks. The fines and any prophylactic remedies will be viewed as
just another cost of doing business by investment banks.
Similarly, SEC enforcement actions against individuals would
not be likely to deter fraud by investment bank employees. In two
of the three enforcement actions brought against investment
banks for the sale of synthetic CDOs, the SEC also sued a mid-
level investment bank employee. In the Citigroup case, following
11-10-19/business/35280755-1-Citigroup-employee-citigroup-unit-fraser-hunter; Jonathan
Stempel, UBS to Pay $49.8 Million to Settle SEC Fraud Charges Over CDO, REUTERS,
Aug. 6, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/06/us-ubs-sec-settlement-idUSBRE
9750TS20130806.
403. Similarly, private fraud actions would seem to have limited deterrence value be-
cause investment banks will often be able to use the element of reasonable or justifiable
reliance to defeat private anti-fraud claims. See Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans and Trust
Funds, 568 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1191-93 (2013) (citing Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v.
Siracusano, 563 U.S. _, _, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2011)); Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485
U.S. 224, 245 (1988) (explaining that reliance is an essential element of a private securi-
ties fraud action but also noting that it is possible for Rule 106-5 plaintiffs to establish a
rebuttable presumption of reliance based on material misrepresentations made to the
general public).
404. Compare Press Release, The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Goldman Sachs Reports
Earnings Per Common Share of $13.18 for 2010 (Jan. 19, 2011), available at http://
www.goldmansachs.conmedia-relations/press-releases/current/pdfs/2010-q4-earnings.
pdf, with Press Release, SEC, Goldman Sachs to Pay Record $550 Million to Settle SEC
Charges Related to Subprime Mortgage CDO (July 15, 2010), available at http://www.
sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-123.htm.
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a trial, the Citigroup employee was found not liable on all
claims.405 In the Goldman case, following a trial, the Goldman
employee was found liable on six claims.4 06 However, because
Goldman paid for Mr. Tourre's legal representation and will pre-
sumably pay any fines assessed against Mr. Tourre, it is difficult
to see the deterrence value.407 Moreover, if the SEC truly wanted
to send a message that would deter fraud, it would bring en-
forcement actions against high-level management of the invest-
ment banks, not mid-level employees.
3. Even Fraud-Free Sales of Synthetic CDOs Could Harm the
Economy
Relying on the antifraud provisions to regulate the sales of
synthetic CDOs is misplaced for an even more important reason.
The real danger of a synthetic CDO is the possibility that risk can
be spread without limitation through the global economy. There-
fore, the sale of a synthetic CDO in a completely fraud-free trans-
action-one where a large, sophisticated, and well-counseled in-
stitutional investor receives all the information it needs to make
an informed investment decision-is just as dangerous to the
economy as a sale in a fraudulent transaction.
B. The Proposed Conflict of Interest Rules Do Not Go Far Enough
to Address the Dangers of Synthetic CDOs
The proposed conflict of interest rules were a direct response to
concerns that the purchasers of notes in synthetic CDOs had been
harmed as a result of bad conduct by investment banks.408 When
adopted, the proposed rules will do what they were supposed to
do: reduce the conflicts of interest that harmed those long inves-
405. Judgment, S.E.C. v. Stoker, 865 F. Supp. 2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2012) (No. 11-
cv-7388); SEC Litigation Release No. 22,541, supra note 313; see also Chat Bray, Jury
Finds Ex-Citigroup Employee Not Liable of Negligence, FIN. NEWS (Aug. 1, 2012),
http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2012-08-01/citigroup-brian-stoker-not-guilty?ea9c8a2
deoeel11045601abo42673622.
406. Verdict, S.E.C. v. Tourre, 2013 WL 3089031 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2013) (No. 10-cv-
3229); Andrew Ross Sorkin, Wall St. Debates Who Should Pay Legal Bills, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Aug. 12, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/08/12/wall-st-debates-who-
should-pay-legal-bills/?_r=0.
407. Id.
408. See infra Part III.A.
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tors.40 9 However, by focusing on conflicts of interest, Congress
missed the opportunity to address the real threat of synthetic
CDOs: that the sale of synthetic CDOs spreads risk in dangerous
ways, possibly leading to another financial crisis.
If the proposed rules could stop synthetic CDOs from spreading
risks throughout the financial system, there would be no need for
further regulation. But the proposed rules do not prohibit in-
vestment banks from selling synthetic CDOs; they merely prohib-
it investment banks from selling synthetic CDOs if the invest-
ment bank would benefit from an adverse performance of the
securities in the reference portfolio. 1o
It is true that the proposed rules will curtail the sale of some
synthetic CDOs. Specifically, as previously discussed,4 1' balance
sheet synthetic CDOs will essentially be prohibited if the pro-
posed rules become effective. However, under the proposed rules,
an investment bank can structure, sell, and take a long position
in the same synthetic CDO.412 An investment bank can even take
a short position in a synthetic CDO, as long as the investment
bank is not also one of the securitization participants. And an in-
vestment bank can structure and sell a synthetic CDO without
taking either a long or short position in the transaction. And it is
likely that the SEC will eventually permit long investors to waive
certain conflicts of interests."' Thus, the proposed conflict of in-
409. See supra Part III.B.; see also, e.g., 156 CONG. REC. S4110 (daily ed. May 24, 2010)
(statement of Sen. Levin).
410. See supra Part V.B.
411. See supra Part V.C.
412. The SEC states that "[n]othing in the proposed interpretation would prevent a
securitization participant from taking positions in which its economic interests would be
aligned with the investors in the [notes] it has created and sold-such as by purchasing
the [notes]." See Proposing Release, supra note 331, at 60,330.
413. The Proposing Release expressly asks for guidance as to "whether certain types of
conflicts relating to an investor could be managed through disclosure." See id. at 60,343.
Although the senators who were the driving force behind Section 621 of the Dodd-Frank
Act have stated that disclosures should not be able to cure conflicts of interest, it seems
probable that the SEC will allow waivers in certain circumstances. See Letter from Jeff
Merkley & Carl Levin, U.S. Senators, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, SEC (Jan. 12, 2012),
available at http://www.levin.senate.gov/download/?id=2b479b46-d4ad-46aa-b2aa-2e0634e
8984a. As the SEC recognized, the federal securities laws already permit conflicts of inter-
est to be managed through disclosure in some circumstances. See Proposing Release, su-
pra note 331, at 60,343. Moreover, full disclosure, followed by the approval of the benefi-
ciaries of the duty, has been accepted in other areas of law as a way to cleanse conflicts of
interest. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2012) (man-
aging self-dealing transactions by a member of a corporation's board of directors through
disclosure and approval); UNIF. P'SHIP CODE § 103(b)(3) (1997), 6 U.L.A. 103(b)(3) (Supp.
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terest rules, when they become effective, will still permit the sale
of many types of synthetic CDOs that could harm the financial
system.
C. Regulation of Synthetic CDOs Should Focus on the Harm to
the Economy, Not Harm to Investors
Synthetic CDOs present a unique danger to the economy. Reg-
ulating synthetic CDOs by focusing on investment bank miscon-
duct or harm to investors does not sufficiently protect the econo-
my. Therefore, regulators need to revisit the regulation of
synthetic CDOs and focus on what really matters: the potential
harm to the economy.
A good start would be for Congress to initiate a study of syn-
thetic CDOs or demand the prompt completion of the long-
overdue414 report required by Section 620 of the Dodd-Frank Act,
which requires a study of bank investment activities.' As part of
the study, the appropriate federal banking agency will be as-
sessing:
(1) [W]hether each activity or investment has or could have a nega-
tive effect on the safety and soundness of the banking entity or the
United States financial system; (2) the appropriateness of the con-
duct of each activity or type of investment by banking entities; and
(3) additional restrictions as may be necessary to address risks to
safety and soundness arising from the activities or types of invest-
416
ments described in subsection (a).
Presumably, this report will study the sale of synthetic CDOs. In
its report on the financial crisis, the U.S. Senate Permanent Sub-
committee on Investigations recommended that the Section 620
study "consider the role of federally insured banks in designing,
2013) (permitting certain aspects of the duty of loyalty to be varied by partners by agree-
ment).
414. The Section 620 study was due January 21, 2012 (not later than 18 months after
the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act). Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 620(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
415. According to Section 620, the appropriate banking agencies are required to review
and consider: "(A) the type of activities or investments; (B) any financial, operational,
managerial, or reputation risks associated with or presented as a result of the banking
entity engaged in the activity or making the investment; and (C) risk mitigation activities
undertaken by the banking entity with regard to the risks." Id. § 620(a)(2).
416. Id.
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marketing, and investing in ... synthetic financial instru-
ments .417
Once the report has been submitted, regulators will be able to
weigh the dangers of synthetic CDOs against the benefits. As
previously discussed,"' the benefits of synthetic CDOs appear to
be slim. The primary benefit offered by synthetic CDOs is risk
management. However, the same risk management could be
achieved through non-synthetic transactions. For example, if a
bank wanted to transfer the risk of certain assets, a cash CDO,
rather than a synthetic CDO, could be used. The cash CDO is
much safer to the financial system because it does not allow the
unlimited spread of risk. Because the potential dangers of syn-
thetic CDOs are so extraordinary, unless the benefits of synthetic
CDOs can be shown to be equally extraordinary, regulators
should give serious consideration to banning the sale of all syn-
thetic CDOs.
VII. CONCLUSION
Investment banks exhibited extraordinary greed and some-
times outrageous misconduct in the sale of synthetic CDOs. It is
understandable that regulators focused on this bad behavior.
However, it was not the bad behavior that furthered the financial
crisis; it was the use of the synthetic CDO itself. Because regula-
tors focused on the wrong problem, the dangers caused by syn-
thetic CDOs still exist. Synthetic CDOs are dangerous to the
economy whether or not an investment bank defrauds its clients.
The danger is present regardless of whether an investment bank
engages in a material conflict of interest or not. The danger exists
even if sales are made in heavily-negotiated transactions with so-
phisticated investors who have access to all the information they
need to make an informed investment decision. Given the obvious
dangers inherent in the sale of synthetic CDOs, unless a compel-
ling argument can be made that synthetic CDOs somehow pro-
vide extraordinary benefits that exceed those dangers, regulators
should consider banning the use of synthetic CDOs.
417. See SENATE STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 639.
418. See supra Part II.B.
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